Paying Politicians
Theory and Evidence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 23365459 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Timothy Besley (London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 2 |
| Issue | 2-3 |
| Pages | 193-215 |
| Publication date | 2004-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of the European Economic Association (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1542-4766 • E-ISSN: 1542-4774 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1162/154247604323067925 |
| OpenAlex | W1553761632 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 76 |
| References cited | 28 |
This paper looks at the theory behind the idea that paying politicians better will improve their performance. The paper lays out a political agency model with adverse selection and moral hazard where politicians are subject to two-period term limits. This model provides a number of predictions about how the pay of politicians affects agency problems. We also consider what happens when the pool of politicians is endogenous. The main ideas in the model are confronted with data on U.S. governors.
Business · Economics · Monetary economics · Public economics · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
Political Selection with Cynical Voters
Perfil político de los diputados mexicanos federales del pan y pri de la LXI Legislatura
Why ruling politicians grow rich faster—Rent-seeking or selection bias
Moonlighting Politicians
De políticos y política
The Declining Talent Pool of Government
The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure
Persistent Court Corruption
Making Politics Work for Development
The Dynamic Effects of Information on Political Corruption
Elite Networks
Revolving Door Lobbyists
Monitoring Corruptible Politicians
Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection
Political careers or career politicians?
A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers
Labor Supply of Politicians
Citizens’ Aversion to Pay Raises for Politicians
A few signatures matter
On the optimality of policy choices in the face of biased beliefs, retrospective voting and the down-up problem
Manager or professional politician? Local fiscal autonomy and the skills of elected officials
A post‐politics earnings penalty? Evidence from politicians' lifetime income trajectories (1970–2019)
Why aren’t more women on the gubernatorial ballot
Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments
A “Selection Model” of Political Representation
Legislative Pensions and Re‐election Seeking
Excessive public employment and rent-seeking traps
What contributes to an attractive local political office? Evidence from municipal council elections in Switzerland
Politicians' Remuneration and Budgetary Behaviour in Czech Municipalities
The Political Resource Curse
Career Rewards for Part‐Time Politicians
Politics as a Vocation? The Impact of the Remuneration of Local Representatives on the Electoral Competition
Who should we pay more? Exploring the influence of pay for elected officials and bureaucrats on organizational performance in South African local government
The Private Returns to Public Office
Les maires et leur rémunération
Introduction. Pouvoir vivre de la politique
La rémunération des élus municipaux québécois
All’s fair in taxation
Strategic public policy around population thresholds
The causes of legal rents extraction
Who seeks reelection
Pay for politicians and campaign spending
Political competition and politician quality
Motivation of politicians and long-term policies
The politicians’ wage gap
Fiscal performance and the re-election of finance ministers–evidence from the Swiss cantons
Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament
Public servants in parliament
Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition
Democratization, personal wealth of politicians and voting behavior
How much is enough? A study of municipal councillor remuneration
Revisiting the Link between Politicians’ Salaries and Corruption
Paying Politicians
Does It Matter How and How Much Politicians are Paid
Salaries and Work Effort
Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery
Political Dynasties in Democracies
Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia
Sortition and cognitive ability
Outside Earnings, Electoral Systems and Legislative Effort in the European Parliament
Corruption and the Incumbency Disadvantage
Political Agency, Election Quality, and Corruption
Capitol Losses
Losing Hurts
Who Rules the World? A Portrait of the Global Leadership Class
The voter’s blunt tool
Grass-roots lobbying and the provision of information-processing resources in state legislatures
Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists
In recognition of councillors
Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda
Citizens' freedom to choose representatives
How Partisan Is Local Law Enforcement? Evidence from Sheriff Cooperation with Immigration Authorities
Dynamic Government Performance
Competing on Good Politicians
Mass Purges
Does Paying Politicians More Promote Economic Diversity in Legislatures
The Responsible Electorate
Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy
The Making of Economic Policy
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses
Bad politicians
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector
Managerial Incentive Problems
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
The control of politicians
Incumbent performance and electoral control
The Responsible Electorate
American State Politics
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests
Comparative Politics and Public Finance
Taxes and Bribery
Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures
Institutional Rules and State Legislator Compensation
Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-93
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
| Unique citing works | 76 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3,62 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 68 |