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"Theoretical Advances Spurred by "Stubborn Facts

A Defense of the Behavioral Economics Paradigm

Bibliographic Data

ID3758159
AuthorsWilliam S Neilson (0000-0002-6789-9378, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume55
Issue8
Pages976-986
Publication date2011-08-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Behavioral Scientist (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-7642 • E-ISSN: 1552-3381
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0002764211409190
OpenAlexW2158317205
LanguageEN
References cited13

Economists have regarded behavioral economics as contributing evidence violating accepted theories. This paper contends that a second, perhaps more important, contribution is the new theory that has arisen to address these challenges. To illustrate, the paper examines how a single observed fact, cooperation in the finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma, has led to extensions of the folk theorem as well as to new concepts including sequential equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, psychological game theory, and pregame and post-game perfection. Thus, the observed departures from previously-standard theories have led to not only new understandings of behavior, but also to additions to the economics toolkit

Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Equilibrium selection · Experimental economics · Folk theorem · Game theory · Mathematical economics · Neoclassical economics · Perfection · Positive economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Repeated game · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Philosophy

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Highly citedNo

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