Manipulative Features of Planning Styles
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4140220 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tore Sager (0000-0001-5781-621X, Department of Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 7491 Trondheim, Norway, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2001 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 765-781 |
| Publication date | 2001-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Environment and Planning A Economy and Space (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0308-518X • E-ISSN: 1472-3409 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1068/a3320 |
| OpenAlex | W2083657811 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 29 |
This paper identifies features of well-known planning modes affecting the likelihood of manipulation. Results from social choice theory and the economic theory of organisation help to explain why certain combinations of planning styles and organisational characteristics stimulate or hamper manipulation. Although the planning process can be rigged in many ways, false revelation of preferences and strategic agenda formation are primarily studied here. When each decisionmaker can rank the alternatives any way he or she wants, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that manipulation-free procedures for making recommendations do not exist unless cyclical decisions or high concentrations of power are accepted. In general, a low probability of cyclical recommendations and a strong organisational bias favouring certain interests and alternatives reduce the likelihood of successful manipulation. It is argued that these conditions are present particularly in advocacy planning and-perhaps counterintuitively-to some extent in disjointed incrementalism
Economics · Incrementalism · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Mathematics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Public Policy and Administration Research
Manipulatory politics
Parallel Systems
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
Foundations of social choice theory
Private Truths, Public Lies
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Social Choice and Individual Values
Deliberative Democracy
Manipulation in planning
Loyalty and the Impossibility of Paretian Advocacy Planning
Putting one over on the boss
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
On division of the question
Discovering manipulated social choices
Pluralistic project design
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
Agenda Control, Organizational Structure, and Bureaucratic Politics
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
I. Habermas and Rationality
Formal Theory and the Institutions of Governance
A Social Choice Perspective on Expertise and Authority in Bureaucracy
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Formal Models of Bureaucracy
Planning Style and Agency Properties
The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,04 |
| Citation span | 2001 - 2001 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |