Heuristics and biases
Expertise and task realism in auditing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4418951 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James F Smith (0009-0009-1704-5778), Thomas Kida |
| Year | 1991 |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 472-489 |
| Publication date | 1991-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Psychological Bulletin (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0033-2909 • E-ISSN: 1939-1455 |
| Publisher | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037//0033-2909.109.3.472 |
| OpenAlex | W4242111691 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 21 |
| References cited | 33 |
Important issues concerning generalizations drawn from heuristics research that depict humans as highly prone to a number of judgmental biases have been raised in recent years. Some researches have argued that the tasks and subjects examined do not adequately represent the contexts to which generalizations are made, citing evidence of improved performance for expert judges working realistic, familar tasks. This article presents additional evidence on these issues by reviewing experimental research on certain heuristics and biases in professional auditor judgments
Audit · Cognitive psychology · Economics · Epistemology · Heuristics · Management · Realism · Task (project management) · Accounting · Big Data and Business Intelligence · Competitive and Knowledge Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Forecasting Techniques and Applications · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · Statistics Education and Methodologies
How alike is it versus how likely is it
Heuristics and Biases
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Individual differences in reasoning
Support theory
Representativeness Revisited
The base rate fallacy reconsidered
Part-set cueing effects in a diagnostic setting with professional auditors
Comparing Ratios
Towards an empirically informed normative Bayesian scheme-based account of argument from expert opinion
A Paradox of Ethics
Expert opinion and probabilistic volcanic risk assessment
Inconsistencies in repeated refugee status decisions
Eliminating recency with self‐review
Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation
The Affect Heuristic
Varieties of Confirmation Bias
Deciding to sell
Expert-novive judgments and new cue sets
Subliminal anchoring
The study of literary expertise as a research strategy
The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning.
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning
Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?
Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of information processing in judgment
Subjective probability
Better Liked than Right
On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task
Features of similarity.
The base-rate fallacy in probability judgments
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing.
Judgment under Uncertainty
On the psychology of prediction.
The citation bias
Impression formation as a function of source credibility and order of presentation of contradictory information
A Confirmation of the Inertial‐ψ Effect in Sequential Choice and Decision
The influence of the accuracy of individuating information on the use of base rate information in probability judgment
Attributed intentions and informational selectivity
Recall for confirming events
Testing hypotheses about other people
Information-gathering processes
The effects of base rates and individuating information on judgments about another person
Behavioral confirmation in social interaction
Intuitive theories of events and the effects of base-rate information on prediction
Decision making and information integration in the courts
Reconstructing the past
Base rates can affect individual predictions
Impression formation as a function of source credibility and the polarity of information
Processing inconsistent social information
Person categories and social perception
Confirmatory and diagnosing strategies in social information gathering
The Doctrine of Psychological Chances
Errors and mistakes
Beyond discrete biases
| Unique citing works | 21 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,62 |
| Citation span | 1992 - 2023 (32) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 20 |