Deep Disagreement (Part 1)
Theories of Deep Disagreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4845596 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chris Ranalli (0000-0002-5652-4829, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, corresponding author), Thirza Lagewaard (0000-0003-0789-1013, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue | 12 |
| Pages | e12886-e12886 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phc3.12886 |
| PMID | 37035466 |
| OpenAlex | W4307350245 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 30 |
| References cited | 65 |
Some disagreements concern our most fundamental beliefs, principles, values, or worldviews, such as those about the existence of God, society and politics, or the trustworthiness of science. These are 'deep disagreements'. But what exactly are deep disagreements? This paper critically overviews theories of deep disagreement. It does three things. First, it explains the differences between deep and other kinds of disagreement, including peer, persistent, and widespread disagreement. Second, it critically overviews two mainstream theories of deep disagreement, the Wittgensteinian account and the Fundamental Epistemic Principle account, before introducing a Hybrid account. Finally, it explores the notion that deep disagreements can be deeper than others
Epistemology · Mainstream · Political science · Politics · Trustworthiness · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Wittgenstein, Religion and Deep Epistemic Injustice
Persuading to See Differences
Reflections on Theories of Deep Disagreement
Bootstrapping and Persuasive Argumentation
Deep Moral Disagreement and Unthinkable Possibilities
Entitlement, Disagreement and Cognitive Disaster
How Deep is Your Disagreement
Trusting Conspiracy Theories
Epistemic Autonomy and the Shaping of Our Epistemic Lives
How Can Constitutivism Account for the Persistence of Deep Disagreements
When should one be open-minded
The Hierarchy of Strife
Rethinking Deep Disagreements
Putting Deep Disagreements in Context
Our(?) Concept of Food or , They are Eating Their Pets
The Methodologically Flawed Discussion about Deep Disagreement
Open-textured moral concepts
Deep Disagreement as a Challenge for Democratic Education
Concept-formation and deep disagreements in theoretical and practical reasoning
A Wittgensteinian take on moral vs. deep disagreements
Moral deep disagreement, self-stultification and forms of life
Lyotard’s Wittgenstein
Method and Morality
Beyond belief
Disagreement-based uncertainty for decision making
Deep moral disagreements and defective contexts
The semiotic roots of worldviews
Deep Agreements
Experts-Part II
Deep Disagreement (Part 1)
Epistemic Angst
Extended Rationality
Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
Fear of Knowledge
Evidentialism
I—Crispin Wright
The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology
A Quasi-Fideist Approach to QAnon
Epistemic injustice and deepened disagreement
Sustaining democracy
On the rational resolution of (deep) disagreements
Fundamental disagreements and the limits of instrumentalism
An evidentialist account of hinges
The moral fixed points
Deep Disagreement (Part 1)
Disagreement as Evidence
| Unique citing works | 30 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 7,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2026 (5) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 28 |