Flexibility now, consistency later

Psychological distance and construal shape evaluative responding

Bibliographic Data

ID6201304
AuthorsAlison Ledgerwood (0000-0002-4535-6276, University of California, Davis), Yaacov Trope (0000-0003-1448-1960, New York University), Shelly Chaiken
Year2010
Volume99
Issue1
Pages32-51
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Personality and Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-3514 • E-ISSN: 1939-1315
PublisherAmerican Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1037/a0019843
PMID20565184
PMCIDPMC3149789
OpenAlexW2171306818
LanguageEN
Citations received71
References cited73

Researchers have long been interested in understanding the conditions under which evaluations will be more or less consistent or context-dependent. The current research explores this issue by asking when stability or flexibility in evaluative responding would be most useful. Integrating construal level theory with research suggesting that variability in the mental representation of an attitude object can produce fluctuations in evaluative responding, we propose a functional relationship between distance and evaluative flexibility. Because individuals construe psychologically proximal objects more concretely, evaluations of proximal objects will tend to incorporate unique information from the current social context, promoting context-specific responses. Conversely, because more distal objects are construed more abstractly, evaluations of distal objects will be less context-dependent. Consistent with this reasoning, the results of 4 studies suggest that when individuals mentally construe an attitude object concretely, either because it is psychologically close or because they have been led to adopt a concrete mindset, their evaluations flexibly incorporate the views of an incidental stranger. However, when individuals think about the same issue more abstractly, their evaluations are less susceptible to incidental social influence and instead reflect their previously reported ideological values. These findings suggest that there are ways of thinking that will tend to produce more or less variability in mental representation across contexts, which in turn shapes evaluative consistency. Connections to shared reality, conformity, and attitude function are discussed

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Conformity · Consistency (knowledge bases) · Construal level theory · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Flexibility (engineering) · Mental representation · Mindset · Object (grammar) · Representation (politics) · Behavioral Health and Interventions · Cultural Differences and Values · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology

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