Presidential Appointments and Personnel
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232867 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David E Lewis (0000-0002-0803-0074, Vanderbilt University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 14 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 47-66 |
| Publication date | 2011-06-15 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042009-121225 |
| OpenAlex | W2131521862 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 58 |
| References cited | 92 |
This article reviews some recent advances in research on presidential appointments and personnel. I focus specifically on research analyzing changes in the institutional environment of presidential personnel, how presidents make decisions about whom to appoint, and the effects of presidential appointees on outputs. I explore what we know about how presidents have worked to change institutions surrounding presidential personnel by increasing the number of appointees and augmenting White House personnel operations. I examine how presidents decide what factors to value when choosing personnel. When do presidents value loyalty, competence, campaign support, or other characteristics of potential appointees? Finally, I examine the effects of appointees on outputs. What influence do appointees have over outputs and why do some have more influence than others? I describe the general trajectory of research in each area as well as some emerging issues confronting scholars in these areas
Competence (human resources · Economics · Loyalty · Management · Political science · Politics · Presidential system · Public relations · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research
The Causal Relationship Between Jurisdiction Size and Institutional Quality
Bureaucratic appointments and coalition support in presidential systems – An analysis of Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies
Party Defection in Senate Confirmations of Executive Nominees
The politics hypothesis and racial disparities in infants’ health in the United States
Picking Winners? Candidate Selection and Representatives’ Performance in the Southern Baptist Conservative Movement
Who gets the prestigious positions? Credentials and ministerial appointments in Africa
Analysing constitutional reform in Britain
Senate Gate-Keeping, Presidential Staffing of “Inferior Offices,” and the Ideological Composition of Appointments to the Public Bureaucracy
Political Targeting in Democracies
The Effects of Polarization on Ideological Certainty
Rulemakers’ Professional Experience and Rulemaking Efficiency in U.S. Federal Agencies
Policy capacity in public administration
The role of aid bureaucracy heads
Legislative Hearings and Presidential Cabinet Management
Interbranch Competition Over Control of Federal Agencies and the Selection of Career Executives
The Politicization Conversation
The Pivotal and Distributive Politics of Senate‐Confirmed Appointee Vacancies
Status and expertise
Presidential partisanship and regulatory review
The Importance of Position
Polarization, Excepted Appointments, and the Administrative Presidency
The Missing Element
The Municipal Administration Quality Index
The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices of Inspector General
Race and Gender Representation in Presidential Appointments, SES, and GS Levels, During Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations
Personal or Party Roots of Civil Service Patronage? Ministerial Change Effects on the Appointments of Top Civil Servants
The institutional foundations of the power to persuade
Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments
Parliamentary scrutiny of executive patronage
Roles, trust and skills
Administrative Politicization or Contestability? How Political Advisers Affect Neutral Competence in Policy Processes
Bureaucratic responsiveness in times of political crisis
Bureaucrats in Congress
Presidential appointments of ministers in South Korea
Macro Implementation
Appointees versus Elected Officials
Strategic Discrimination in Hierarchies
Executive control of bureaucracy and presidential cabinet appointments in East Asian democracies
Bureaucratic professionalization and cabinet management
Ministerial Leadership and Endorsement of Bureaucrats
Patronage and Presidential Coalition Formation
The Fix is in? Parliamentary Scrutiny of Appointments of the Heads of Brazilian Regulatory Agencies
The Structure of Appointment Politics
Strategic promotion, reputation, and responsiveness in bureaucratic hierarchies
Indirect accountability of political appointees
Executive appointments
Handmaidens of the legislature? Understanding regulatory timing
Executive Control and Turnover in the Senior Executive Service
Working Towards Policy
Exploring the Determinants of the Entry and Exit of Ministers inKorea
Political and administrative control of expert groups—A mixed‐methods study
Parties Are Not the Only Patrons
How Patronage Delivers
O controle presidencial sobre as nomeações para a alta burocracia federal
Nomeação a cargos públicos no Brasil
Informing the Leader
Experimentation and Persuasion in Political Organizations
American Civil-Military Relations and Presidential Power of Removal
A government of strangers
History of the United States civil service.
Managing the President's Program
What Motivates Bureaucrats?
Building a New American State
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
The Politics of the Police
Delegating Powers
Structure and Process, Politics and Policy
Agency Design and Distributive Politics
Becoming President
The President’s Call
The presidency and the political system
Avoiding Advice and Consent
Agreeable Administrators? Analyzing the Public Positions of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidents
The Appointments Process and the Administrative Presidency
The Revolution in Presidential Studies
The White House Office of Presidential Personnel
The 2008‐2009 Presidential Transition Through the Voices of Its Participants
Revisiting the Administrative Presidency
The Politics of Presidential Appointments
Right Turn
A Response to Mr. Laski
The Republican Era, 1869-1901
Thinking the Unthinkable in Public Administration
Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies
Men Who Govern
The Jacksonians
Political Management Strategies and Polical/Career Relationships
In the Web of Politics
Bureaucratic Dynamics
A Government of Strangers
Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States
Presidential Influence and the Administrative State
The Assistant Secretaries. Problems and Processes of Appointment
The Rise and Decline of the Spoils Tradition
The Political Views of U.S. Senior Federal Executives, 1970-1992
Effective Continuity of U. S. Government Operations in Jeopardy
The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation
Advice and Consent
Patronage, the Pendleton Act, and the Power of the People
The Politics of Investigations and Regulatory Enforcement by Independent Agents and Cabinet Appointees
Secretaries of Pork? A New Theory of Distributive Public Policy
Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design
A Short, Ironic History of American National Bureaucracy
A Mid-Term Appraisal-The Reagan Presidency
Political Appointees and Career Executives
Reducing the Adversarial Burden on Presidential Appointees
The Silent Revolution in Patronage
The Politics of Requesting Appointments
Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences
Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design
Confirmation Dynamics
Strategic Appointments
Amateur Government
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration
Slackers and Zealots
The Appointments Dilemma
Still Clashing after All These Years
A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion
A Comparative Analysis of Public and Private Sector Entrant Quality
Political Appointments, Civil Service Systems, and Bureaucratic Competence
Separated Powers in the United States
Does Politics Make a Difference at the EEOC
What Is Patronage? A Critical Reexamination
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
The Study of Administration
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch
Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Corruption Prosecutions
The Selection of Federal Political Executives
Presidential Power versus Bureaucratic Intransigence
Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation
| Unique citing works | 58 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4,46 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2026 (14) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 58 |