Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not

A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War

Bibliographic Data

ID6273370
AuthorsJohn A Vasquez (0000-0001-8728-3688, Vanderbilt University, corresponding author)
Year1996
Volume40
Issue4
Pages531
Publication date1996-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2600890
OpenAlexW2314689170
LanguageEN
Citations received79
References cited22

Many interstate enduring rivalries experience wars, some do not. This analysis presents and tests an explanation of whether, why, and how rivals go to war. It is argued that rivalries between equal states that do not go to war are those in which territorial issues are not at stake. Rivalries in the absence of territorial issues tend to go to war only by being embroiled in an ongoing war by a third party. A series of tests with emphasis on rivalries between major states occurring during 1816–1986 supports the territorial explanation. Two distinct paths to war are empirically identified—one leading to a dyadic war involving a territorial dispute(s) and a second path by which rivals without a territorial dispute join an ongoing war because of contagion factors

Economic history · Economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Spanish Civil War · Territorial dispute · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Conflict and Governance

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