Information and Economic Interdependence
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283511 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Reed (0000-0002-4580-485X, Department of Political Science Rice University), William L Reed (Rice University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2003 |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 54-71 |
| Publication date | 2003-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002702239511 |
| OpenAlex | W2124138711 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 43 |
| References cited | 41 |
The pacifying effect of economic interdependence on conflict onset can be better understood in the context of "noisy" bargaining. Specifically, trading states bargain under less noisy conditions and, as a result, are unlikely to engage in militarized conflict. Noise is introduced into a generic take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game in the form of nonspecific asymmetric information about the defender's reservation value. Comparative statics show a positive monotonic relationship between variance in the noise term and the onset of militarized conflict. The relationships among economic interdependence, variance in the noise term, and conflict onset are evaluated with a Bayesian heteroskedastic probit model. Historical data are used to demonstrate that interdependence and uncertainty are related to each other and jointly related to the onset of militarized conflict. Uncertainty appears to be reduced by economic interdependence, and this leads to an enhanced probability of agreement short of a militarized clash
Context (archaeology · Econometrics · Economic interdependence · Economics · Microeconomics · Noise (video · Political science · Probabilistic logic · Statistics · Variance (accounting · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Mathematics · Political Conflict and Governance
Interdependence, Development, and Interstate Conflict
International Trade and The Onset and Escalation of Interstate Conflict
Religion and Political Economy
Principles of Conflict Economics
Alliance Formation and Conflict Initiation
Anti-Americanism in Latin America
Assessing Sino-Indian Economic Relations in an Interdependence Framework
US–China commercial rivalry, great war and middle powers
Presidential Personality
Trade Relationships and Asymmetric Crisis Perception
Political Institutions and Constrained Response to Economic Sanctions
Evaluating the Effects of Trade on Militarized Behavior in the Context of Territorial Threat
Commerce between rivals
Turkey’s economic rapprochement towards Syria and the territorial conflict over Hatay
Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability
Bluff to peace
Militarized Compellent Threats, 1918–2001
The Relevance of Politically Relevant Dyads in the Study of Interdependence and Dyadic Disputes
Success of economic sanctions threats
Preferential Trade Agreements and Trade Expectations Theory
International Crises and the Capitalist Peace
Trading on Preconceptions
Complex global value chains and economic interdependence
Estimating the Severity of the WikiLeaks U.S. Diplomatic Cables Disclosure
Information, Commitment, and War
The Achilles' Heel of Liberal IR Theory
Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict
Unifying the Study of the Causes and Duration of Wars
Back to the Future
Exploring the Bargaining Model of War
More dangerous than dyads
Teaching the Enemy
Building a Science of World Politics
Testing Two Explanations of the Liberal Peace
State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade
Protecting Trade by Legalizing Political Disputes
The Determinants of Uncertainty in International Relations
Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict Among Member-States
The Purse Strings of Peace
Beyond Ricardo
Observing the capitalist peace
Foreign direct investment and militarized international conflict
The deterrent effects of economic integration
Triangulating Peace
Political community and the North Atlantic area
Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
Bayesian Analysis of Binary and Polychotomous Response Data
Regions of War and Peace
Democratic Commitments
Specification Error in Probit Models
Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992
An extension of the correlates of war formal alliance data set, 1648–1815
Regime types and status quo evaluations
Is the liberal peace just an artifact of cold war interests? Assessing recent critiques
Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany
Taking Time Seriously
The Kantian Peace
Estimation and Inference Are Missing Data Problems
Location, Location, Location
Nonparametric Model Discrimination in International Relations
Risky Inference
The Classical Liberals Were Right
Clear and Clean
Rationalist explanations for war
Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War
Investing in the Peace
Voter Choice in Multi-Party Democracies
Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making
Causal Heterogeneity in Comparative Research
Deterring Intervention
Kant We All Just get Along? Opportunity, Willingness, and the Origins of the Democratic Peace
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy
Estimation and Inference via Bayesian Simulation
Duration Models and Proportional Hazards in Political Science
Interpreting Heteroscedasticity
Testing Theories of Strategic Choice
Liberalism and Interdependence
Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications
Globalization and Peace
Bayesian Inference for Comparative Research
Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986
Binomial-Beta Hierarchical Models for Ecological Inference
| Unique citing works | 43 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,87 |
| Citation span | 2003 - 2026 (24) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 43 |