Quick on the Draw
American Negativity Bias and Costly Signals in International Relations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6283524 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Seok Joon Kim (0000-0001-8077-3158, Korea University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 66 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 246-271 |
| Publication date | 2022-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/00220027211040104 |
| OpenAlex | W3202020147 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 45 |
States signal their intentions to domestic and foreign audiences but are not always believed. Why do people believe some state signals but not others? Using a survey experiment on a representative sample of the US public, this study finds that individuals have a negativity bias when assessing the credibility of state signals. They take other states’ aggressive actions as evidence of deep hostility but are skeptical of the credibility of conciliatory gestures. The experimental result shows that the mobilization of a small proportion of an army is perceived credible enough as an aggressive action, while the removal of even a large proportion is not perceived as conciliatory. The psychological mechanism found here is a strong foundation for theorizing about how individuals process information embedded in state signals and can improve our understanding of signaling
Cognitive psychology · Credibility · Deception · Epistemology · Foundation (evidence · Hostility · Negativity bias · Negativity effect · Overconfidence effect · Perception · Political science · Skepticism · State (computer science · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion
Signaling Theory
Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance, and Contagion
The logic of images in international relations.
Rational Theory of International Politics
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
Trust and Mistrust in International Relations
Positive-Negative Asymmetry in Evaluations
Threat and Information Acquisition
American Opinion Toward the Soviet Union
Bad World
In the Eye of the Beholder
Homo Diplomaticus
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics
Cooperation under the Security Dilemma
The Security Dilemma Revisited
Hypotheses on Misperception
On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences
Are Costly Signals More Credible? Evidence of Sender-Receiver Gaps
Political Implications of Loss Aversion
Thawing Rivalries and Fading Friendships
Negativity in political perception
Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research
Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies
Identity, Power, and Threat Perception
Signaling Foreign Policy Interests
Tying Hands, Sinking Costs, and Leader Attributes
Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests
Folk Realism
Uncertain about Uncertainty
Misperceptions About Perceptual Bias
Two Explanations for Negativity Effects in Political Behavior
How Do Observers Assess Resolve
Realists as optimists
The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy
Sheep in Sheep's clothing
Bad is Stronger than Good
Images in International Relations
Heuristic Decision Making
Availability
Asymmetrical effects of positive and negative events
How are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A Hierarchical Model
Mass Public Decisions on Go to War
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2025 (4) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |