Distributive Outcomes in Contested Maritime Areas

The Role of Inside Options in Settling Competing Claims

Bibliographic Data

ID6284068
AuthorsÁslaug Ásgeirsdóttir (Bates College, corresponding author), Martin C Steinwand (0000-0002-4218-0164, Stony Brook University)
Year2018
Volume62
Issue6
Pages1284-1313
Publication date2018-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002716677568
OpenAlexW2552842407
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited51

Outside options can induce bargaining asymmetries that influence the outcome of international negotiations. This article focuses, however, on the impact of a regime-provided inside option on the willingness to cooperate and the distributive outcomes reached. Using a new data set covering 417 maritime boundaries, that fall under the Law of the Sea framework, this article shows that the ability to find agreement is closely linked to the distributional outcomes that states are able to realize. Different potential gains from cooperation result in bargaining asymmetries that influence both the ability to settle a maritime boundary and the distributive outcome reached when cooperation succeeds. Our evidence shows that the opportunity to invest in long-term projects that require legal certainty, such as offshore oil, facilitates cooperation and is associated with smaller distributional adjustments

Distributive property · Economics · Political economy · Political science · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Island Studies and Pacific Affairs · Mathematics

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