To Kill and Tell? State Power, Criminal Competition, and Drug Violence

Bibliographic Data

ID6284859
AuthorsAngélica Durán-Martínez (0000-0002-7537-4256, University of Massachusetts Lowell, corresponding author)
Year2015
Volume59
Issue8
Pages1377-1402
Publication date2015-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/0022002715587047
OpenAlexW2275492061
LanguageEN
Citations received97
References cited30

Violence is commonly viewed as an inherent attribute of the drug trade. Yet, there is dramatic variation in drug violence within countries afflicted by drug trafficking. This article advances a novel framework that explains how the interaction between two critical variables, the cohesion of the state security apparatus, and the competition in the illegal market determines traffickers’ incentives to employ violence. The analysis introduces a generally overlooked dimension of violence, its visibility. Visibility refers to whether traffickers publicly expose their use of violence or claim responsibility for their attacks. Drawing on fieldwork in five cities in Colombia and Mexico (Cali, Medellin, Ciudad Juárez, Culiacán, and Tijuana), 175 interviews, and a new data set on drug violence, I argue that violence becomes visible and frequent when trafficking organizations compete and the state security apparatus is fragmented. By contrast, violence becomes less visible and less frequent when the criminal market is monopolized and the state security apparatus is cohesive

Competition (biology · Criminology · Drug trafficking · Economics · Incentive · Market economy · Organised crime · Political science · Sociology · State (computer science · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · HIV, Drug Use, Sexual Risk · Political Conflict and Governance

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