Can Western Donors Constrain Repressive Governments? Evidence from Debt Relief Negotiations in Africa

Bibliographic Data

ID6285502
AuthorsBrett L Carter (0000-0002-4443-8798, University of Southern California, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume67
Issue6
Pages1183-1217
Publication date2023-07-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766
PublisherSAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1177/00220027221126156
OpenAlexW4296350333
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited73

There is limited evidence that reliance on foreign aid from Western donors compels repressive governments to embrace democratic reforms and respect citizens’ rights. However, donors have another, potentially more powerful source of financial leverage: debt relief. This paper exploits two features of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, launched by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1996, to probe whether Western leverage has constrained repression across Africa. First, the Bretton Woods institutions initiated debt relief negotiations with virtually all African governments. Second, many recipients were in power long before HIPC negotiations began and remained after they concluded. Using a differences-in-differences estimator, I show that the daily rate of repression fell by between 10% and 30% during debt relief negotiations. This effect holds across autocracies and democracies, and during periods of sustained protests. When debt crises were more severe, debt relief negotiations were even more constraining

Autocracy · Debt · Democracy · Development economics · Economic policy · Economics · External debt · Financial system · Internal debt · International economics · Leverage (statistics · Monetary economics · Negotiation · Political science · Economic Growth and Development · Finance · International Development and Aid · Law · Religion, Society, and Development

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