Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6273095 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard A Nielsen (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 791-803 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/isqu.12049 |
| OpenAlex | W2163593823 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 102 |
| References cited | 60 |
This article provides theoretical and empirical solutions to two connected puzzles in the study of foreign aid and human rights: Do foreign aid donors use aid sanctions to punish repressive states, and if so, why? I show that donors impose aid sanctions selectively. Aid sanctions typically occur when repressive states do not have close political ties to aid donors, when violations have negative consequences for donors and when violations are widely publicized. Using a data set of bilateral foreign aid to 118 developing countries between 1981 and 2004, I find that variation in these factors largely accounts for the differing aid sanctions that result from objectively similar rights violations by the governments of developing countries
Development aid · Economics · Human rights · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Sanctions · Economic Growth and Development · International Development and Aid · Law · Religion, Society, and Development
Regime Threats and State Solutions
Human rights shaming through Ingos and foreign aid delivery
The relational politics of shame
Protecting at Home or Providing Abroad
Is development aid securitized? Evidence from a cross‐country examination of aid commitments
Public support for political conditionality in Africa
International Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa
Costly Signals
Shaming and Treaty Ratification
Shame, endorse, or remain silent
Teargas and Selfie Cams
Aiding and Abetting
Competing Concerns
The Trump Administration Versus Human Rights
UN Human Rights Shaming and Foreign Aid Allocation
Walking a Tightrope
Democratic Openings and Country Visibility
Using the Carrot as the Stick
To What End? Policy Objectives and US Public Support for Political Warfare
All Things Work Together for Good
Bureaucratic Responsiveness in Humanitarian Aid
NGO repression as a predictor of worsening human rights abuses
Who cares about human rights? Public opinion about human rights foreign policy
Promoting ‘good behaviour’ through aid
Foreign aid donors, domestic actors, and human rights violations
The will to do good and the clash of practices
Foreign Aid for Human Rights
The political motivations of the United States’ bilateral investment treaty program
Can foreign aid donors credibly threaten to suspend aid? Evidence from a cross-national survey of donor officials
US aid and substitution of human rights violations
Economic sanctions and income inequality
Foreign aid and transnational terrorism
To sanction or not to sanction
Sanctions effectiveness, development and regime type. Are aid suspensions and economic sanctions alike
Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in Economic Crises
Revenue Substitution? How Foreign Aid Inflows Moderate the Effect of Bilateral Trade Pressures on Labor Rights
Foreign pressure and public opinion in target states
Human Rights Shaming and FDI
Bilateral Donors and the Age of the National Interest
Coercive and catalytic strategies for human rights promotion
The flag and the stick
Foreign aid withdrawals and suspensions
Public support for development aid during the Covid-19 pandemic
Diverging Visions on Political Conditionality
Aid effectiveness and donor motives
Do aid agencies comply with human rights requirements in Practice? Systematic evidence on the integration of human rights in German development cooperation
Competition, Aid, and Violence against Civilians
Foreign policy begins at home
Political Context and the Consequences of Naming and Shaming for Human Rights Abuse
Punishing the violators? Arms embargoes and economic sanctions as tools of norm enforcement
From conditionality to weaponisation
Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights
Foreign interests and state repression
When Does Security Cooperation Increase Foreign Aid Allocation
Who Gets the Guns? How Democratic Values and Security Threats Affect American Attitudes Toward Military Aid
Human Rights Promotion and Democratic Allies
Pushing Back or Backing Down? Evidence on Donor Responses to Restrictive NGO Legislation
Aiding Human Rights? The Effect of U.S., European, and Chinese Development Assistance on Rights Practices in Recipient Countries, 2001 to 2017
Media-driven Humanitarianism? News Media Coverage of Human Rights Abuses and the Use of Economic Sanctions
Buying Silence
Monitoring the Monitor? Selective Responses to Human Rights Transgressions
Aid Sanctions and Hybrid Regimes
We Only Care What You Do, Not Who You Are
Bilateral or Multilateral? International Financial Flows and the Dirty-Work Hypothesis
International Organizations and Naming and Shaming
Media Freedom and the Escalation of State Violence
Donor Competition and Public Support for Foreign Aid Sanctions
Domestic Politics and the Motives of Emerging Donors
Defining and Modeling State-Dependent Dynamic Systems
Democratizing dictators? Non-democratic regime conditions and the allocation of US democracy assistance, 1975–2010
Do sanction types affect the duration of economic sanctions? The case of foreign aid
Can Western Donors Constrain Repressive Governments? Evidence from Debt Relief Negotiations in Africa
Secret Police Organizations and State Repression
Governments, Informal Links to Militias, and Accountability
The Political Costs of Abusing Human Rights
Carrots as Sticks
Risk Mitigation, Regime Security, and Militias
Rewards for Ratification
Sanction Consequences and Citizen Support
Human Rights Regimes, Reputation, and Foreign Direct Investment
Sanctions and Signals
The Path of the Boomerang
Voters Get What They Want (When They Pay Attention)
Sanctions, Uncertainty, and Leader Tenure
Autocratic Consent to International Law
Can the International Criminal Court Deter Atrocity
Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy
Do aid punishments work forever? Recipients’ incentives for partial democratization and timing of aid punishments after coups
Authoritarian collaboration and repression in the digital age
How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
How Do People Evaluate Foreign Aid To ‘Nasty’ Regimes
The Public’s Foreign Aid Priorities
The politics of human rights trade sanctions
Populism and foreign aid
Multilateral donors and the security-development nexus
For better or worse
A dictator's toolkit
United Nations endorsement and support for human rights
A social science of human rights
The Contradictory Impact of Transnational Aids Institutions on State Repression in China, 1989-2013
The Pattern of Aid Giving
Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth
A Panel Data Analysis of the Fungibility of Foreign Aid
Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions—a three-dimensional panel analysis
Aid, Growth and Democracy
Global horse trading
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?
Moral Vision in International Politics
The Power of Human Rights
Bilateral Donors’ Interest vs. Recipients’ Development Motives in Aid Allocation
Technical Assistance and Capacity Development in an Aid-dependent Economy
Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944
Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Revisited
International Human Rights
Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work
Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work
The Sanctions Glass
The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy
Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis
Do Human Rights Matter in Bilateral Aid Allocation? A Quantitative Analysis of 21 Donor Countries
How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations
Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with Panel Data
Counting Chickens when they Hatch
Human Rights Abuses
The Influence of Le Monde Coverage on French Foreign Aid Allocations
The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003
Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human Rights in Latin America
Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries
What Attracts Foreign Investors? An Examination of Human Rights and Foreign Direct Investment
Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both
Estimating the Impact of State Policies and Institutions with Mixed-Level Data
How Robust Standard Errors Expose Methodological Problems They Do Not Fix, and What to Do About It
Fear of Persecution
Expanded Trade and GDP Data
Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions
A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation
Transnational Information Politics
United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance
Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy
A Political Economy of Aid
Conditioning the Effects of Aid
Refugees and the Spread of Civil War
Political Institutions and Human Rights
The Externalities of Civil Strife
Human Rights and Economic Aid Allocation under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter
Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered
Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-cold War Period, 1991-96
The Cost of Shame
Effects of Civil Wars on International Trade, 1950-92
European Aid
Armed Conflict 1946-2001
| Unique citing works | 102 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 8,5 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2026 (13) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | Yes |
| Citation types | Neutral: 102 |