Monitoring the Monitor? Selective Responses to Human Rights Transgressions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7301845 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hana Attia (0000-0001-5894-2947, German Institute for Global and Area Studies and University of Konstanz, Germany), Julia Grauvogel (0000-0003-1995-4632, German Institute for Global and Area Studies) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 67 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Publication date | 2023-03-14 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqad014 |
| OpenAlex | W4327944377 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 56 |
Sanctions are among the most frequently used foreign policy tools to address human rights violations, but they can be highly politicized. Since the early 2000s, human rights sanctions have been increasingly triggered by standardized rankings of states’ performances. While research on economic statecraft suggests that coercive measures based on cross-national assessments may be less influenced by strategic considerations, scholarship on rankings highlights how standardized performance indicators can also be political. This paper investigates whether sanctions based on standardized human rights assessments are also influenced by senders’ strategic political and economic interests. Empirically, we examine the case of United States human trafficking sanctions that combines universal rankings in the first stage and country-specific sanctions waivers in the second. The analysis leverages novel data on all Trafficking in Persons (TIP) rankings by the US State Department and presidential sanctions waivers from 2003 to 2018. Despite the TIP report's reputation as a reliable indicator, we find that both stages in the process of imposing human trafficking sanctions are driven by strategic attempts to minimize the economic and political costs of sanctions for the US. These findings have broader implications for the reputation and effectiveness of other human rights rankings by the US
Economic sanctions · Economics · Foreign policy · Human rights · Law and economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Reputation · Sanctions · Scholarship · State (computer science · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
Democracy Prevention
Scorecard Diplomacy
Foreign Aid and Political Reform
How are These Pictures Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995
Defending Democratic Norms
Varieties of Democracy
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Governance by Indicators
Threat by Example
Improving the Effectiveness of the International Law of Human Trafficking
Forcing the President's Hand
The Construction of Human Rights
The Rankings Game
Aid sanctions and political conditionality
The power of numbers in global governance
The bark is the bite
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Donor Interests or Developmental Performance? Explaining Sanctions in EU Democracy Promotion in sub-Saharan Africa
Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy
Governing the world at a distance
A Critique of the Global Trafficking Discourse and U.S. Policy
The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice
Sanctions and Alternate Markets
Back to the Future
The Politics of Rating Freedom
An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success
Political Relations, Leader Stability, and Economic Coercion
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion
Nudging the Needle
Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States
The Latin Bias
Introduction
Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive
Politics by Number
The Donor’s Dilemma
TIP for Tat
Bad science
Examining the State
Economic sanctions
Democratic Sanctions
Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-cold War Period, 1991-96
The Economic Peace Between Democracies
Not all dictators are equal
Structural estimation of economic sanctions
Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,67 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |