The Politics of International Oversight
Strategic Monitoring and Legal Compliance in the European Union
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7582385 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joshua C Fjelstul (0000-0002-9494-260X, Emory University, corresponding author), Clifford J Carrubba (0000-0001-6397-7343, Emory University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 429-445 |
| Publication date | 2018-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0003055418000096 |
| OpenAlex | W2794067958 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 39 |
| References cited | 63 |
States often violate international agreements, both accidentally and intentionally. To process complaints efficiently, states can create formal, pretrial procedures in which governments can negotiate with litigants before a case ever goes to court. If disputes are resolved during pretrial negotiations, it can be very difficult to tell what has happened. Are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped? This paper presents a formal model to address these questions. We develop our theory in the context of the European Union (EU). To test our model, we collect a new dataset of over 13,000 Commission infringement cases against EU member states (2003–2013). Our results suggest that accidental and intentional noncompliance both occur, but that intentional noncompliance is more common in the EU. We find that the Commission is an effective, if imperfect, monitor and enforcer of international law. The Commission can correct intentional noncompliance, but not always. It strategically drops cases that it believes it is unlikely to win
Accidental · Business · Commission · Compliance (psychology · Context (archaeology · Economics · European commission · European union · Imperfect · International trade · Law and economics · Negotiation · Political science · Politics · European and International Law Studies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Psychology
Time efficiency as a measure of court performance
Interactions in a politicised Europe
EU Policymaking and Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts
Infringements of European Union law at the local and regional level across Member States
How the Chamber System at the CJEU Undermines the Consistency of the Court’s Application of EU Law
The CJEU Database Platform
The European Court of Justice and legal European integration
The politics of the Court of Justice of the European Union
Are European Court of Justice judges biased towards their member states
Seeking legitimacy
The European Commission’s response to national emergency regimes within the EU’s asylum policy
Examining the impact of institutions on common pool resource problems
Permission to bail out EU’s national flag carriers? Technocratic and political determinants of commission approval of state aid to national airlines in difficulties in the pre-Covid era
Improving the efficiency of pretrial bargaining in disputes over noncompliance with international law
Follow the leader
Stronger conditionality for stronger compliance? Analysing the NGEU’s effect on the implementation of European semester recommendations
Legal Instrument Choice in the European Union
Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission
Limits of Law in the Multilevel System
Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance
Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis
The evolution of European Union law
Two sides of the same coin? The effect of differentiation on noncompliance with European Union law
When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance
How do institutional constraints affect judicial decision-making? The European Court of Justice’s French language mandate
Special Interests in Foreign Policy Bureaucracies
Bureaucratic Structure and Compliance with International Agreements
The political economy of noncompliance in customs unions
Seizing opportunities
Distorted promotion of undistorted competition? Commission decisions after formal investigations in the EU state aid regime
A guardian in need of support
When does the EU commission listen to experts? Analysing the effect of external compliance assessments on supranational enforcement in the EU
Different shades of responsiveness
Enforcement and public opinion
Compliance with EU Law from 1989 to 2018
The EU Commission
At loggerheads over state aid
Beyond Balkan exceptionalism. Assessing compliance with EU law in Bulgaria and Romania
Institutional reform and public attitudes toward EU decision making
Complying with Europe
Justice Contained
Governance Matters VIII
Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe
Establishing the Supremacy of European Law
After Hegemony
The Worldwide Governance Indicators
Mobilizing for Human Rights
Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering
Do Member States Make European Policies Work? Analysing the Eu Transposition Deficit
Measuring party positions in Europe
The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics
Compliance and Conflict Management in the European Union
Non‐compliance and the European commission's role in integration
Non-compliance in the European Union
After conditionality
Why there is no 'southern problem'. On environmental leaders and laggards in the European Union
The European Union's Legal System and Domestic Policy
Paths to Compliance
The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union
Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union
Implementing Europe
Embracing European Law
The transposition of European law in EU member states
Obstinate and Inefficient
The Paradox of Compliance
The Strategic Nature of Compliance
Constructing a Supranational Constitution
Judicial Behavior under Political Constraints
Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's Administrative Capacity Requirement
Good Instructions in No Time? Domestic Coordination of EU Policies in 19 Small States
Courts and Compliance in International Regulatory Regimes
Improving Tests of Theories Positing Interaction
Why Denmark and Belgium Have Different Implementation Records
Understanding Interaction Models
The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts
Complying with EU directives' requirements
Why governments comply
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions
On compliance
Is the good news about compliance good news about cooperation
Europe Before the Court
Credible Commitments and the International Criminal Court
Mixing Methods
The collective action of data collection
Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay
It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid
The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the acquis communautaire, 1998–2009
The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council on Delays in the Transposition of EU Directives
Non-conformable, partial and conformable transposition
Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance
Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research
Opposition through the back door in the transposition of EU directives
Why National States Comply with Supranational Law
Reliability and validity of the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill expert surveys on party positioning
International Courts
Troubles with Transposition? Explaining Trends in Member-State Notification and the Delayed Transposition of EU Directives
Stability and Rigidity
Estimating party policy positions
| Unique citing works | 39 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 5,57 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 39 |