The Value of Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8092938 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ruth Wedgwood (0000-0003-1391-2407, corresponding author), Ralph Wedgwood |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 73 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 153-157 |
| Publication date | 2017-09-21 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Normativity of Rationality (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/oso/9780198802693.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2930074847 |
| Open Library | OL28632968M |
| ISBN | 9780198802693 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 64 |
Rationality is a central concept for epistemology, ethics, and the study of practical reason. But what sort of concept is it? It is argued here that—contrary to objections that have recently been raised—rationality is a normative concept. In general, normative concepts cannot be explained in terms of the concepts expressed by ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’. Instead, normative concepts are best understood in terms of values . Thus, for a mental state or a process of reasoning to be rational is for it to be in a certain way good . Specifically, rationality is a virtue , while irrationality is a vice . What rationality requires of you at a time is whatever is necessary for your thinking at that time to be as rational as possible; this makes ‘rationally required’ equivalent to a kind of ‘ought’. Moreover, rationality is an “internalist” normative concept: what it is rational for you to think at a time depends purely on what is in your mind at that time. Nonetheless, rationality has an external goal—namely, getting things right in your thinking, or thinking correctly. The connection between rationality and correctness is probabilistic: if your thinking is irrational, that is bad news about your thinking’s degree of correctness; and the more irrational your thinking is, the worse the news is about your thinking’s degree of correctness. This account of the concept of rationality indicates how we should set about giving a substantive theory of what it is for beliefs and choices to be rational
Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Statistics · Value (mathematics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · 149.2 · B833 .w43 2017 · Ethics · Philosophy of mind · Rationalism · Reason · Philosophy
The Normative, the Practical, and the Deliberatively Indispensable
The Rationality of Covid-19 Vaccine Hesitancy
The Study of Inference in Philosophy and Comparative Psychology
Planning Facts Through Law
Vox Populi, Vox ChatGPT
On the Epistemic Value of Reflection
What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality
Inferentialist Truth Pluralism
Questions Should Have Answers
On the rationality of emotion regulation
The Ubiquity of Higher‐Order Defeat
Spinozan Doxasticism About Delusions
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
Metaphysics of the Bayesian mind
Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality
Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms
An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization
Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules
The Motivating Role of Truth in Reasoning
Epistemic Rationality Begins Unreflectively
Internalism and Culpable Irrationality
Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence
Expressivism and Explaining Irrationality
A Puzzle About the Unity and Normativity of Structural Rationality
Aesthetic peerhood and the significance of aesthetic peer disagreement
Dualism about undercutting defeat
Rational Defeat Beyond Belief
Against the newer evidentialists
The many ‘oughts’ of deliberation
Justification as a dimension of rationality
Real and ideal rationality
Metanormative regress
Epistemology without guidance
How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating
Rationally irresolvable disagreement
Can our reasons determine what it is rational for us to believe
Making space for the normativity of coherence
Are epistemic reasons normative
Internalism without cartesianism privilege
Aristotle on Reasoning and Rational Animals
Should Effective Altruists Always Maximize Expected Value
The Moral Universe
Shifting Scope
False Beliefs and Misleading Evidence
Good and Ought in Argumentation
Self-Knowledge Requirements and Moore's Paradox
Ethics in the Software Development Process
Rationality, Shmationality
Reasons
Practical Commitment in Normative Discourse
Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology
Mushy Akrasia
Normative explanation unchained
Perspectives and good dispositions
Moral worth and skillful action
Bayesianism and self-doubt
Cogito and Moore
The internalist virtue theory of knowledge
The weight of truth
The explanatory role of consistency requirements
The irrational failure to act
Shared Agency Without Shared Intention
The deliberative constraint on reasons
| Unique citing works | 64 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 9,14 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2026 (8) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 64 |