Some Principles of Postpositivistic Philosophy of Science

Bibliographic Data

ID9734855
AuthorsJames W Garrison (0000-0002-0590-5285, Virginia Tech, corresponding author)
Year1986
Volume15
Issue9
Pages12-18
Publication date1986-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEducational Researcher (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-189X • E-ISSN: 1935-102X
PublisherAmerican Educational Research Association (AERA) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.3102/0013189x015009012
OpenAlexW2090830725
LanguageEN
Citations received27
References cited23

In recent years there has been a great deal of methodological debate among educational researchers, theoreticians, and practitioners concerning issues such as relativism raised by the so-called “new,” “Kuhnian” or “postpositivistic” philosophy of science. The intensity of this debate notwithstanding, the fundamental principles and their relations that comprise the postpositivistic view have not always been carefully spelled out. Some of the principles discussed will include (a) the problem of confirmation, (b) the underdetermination of theory by logic, (c) the underdetermination of theory by experience, (d) the Quine-Duhem thesis, (e) the theory-ladenness of experience, and (f) the incommensurability of theories. No attempt will be made to evaluate these principles. However, those who are prepared to accept all of these will be hard pressed to avoid the dangers of relativism. I will argue that these dangers, if they exist, may be lessened if not eliminated by practicing the pragmatic virtues of epistemological conservatism and good sense

Conservatism · Epistemology · Philosophy of science · Political science · Quine · Received view of theories · Relativism · Underdetermination · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education

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