Mediation and Conflict Prevention
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10071727 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gerald Eisenkopf (0000-0003-2418-568X, University of Konstanz, corresponding author), André Bächtiger (0000-0001-6633-0609, University of Lucerne) |
| Year | 2012 |
| Volume | 57 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 570-597 |
| Publication date | 2012-06-28 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022002712448910 |
| OpenAlex | W2078840792 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 50 |
Mediation is a popular process to prevent conflicts over common resources, but there is little clean insight into its effectiveness and mechanisms. Our experimental approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of third-party intervention into potential conflicts and circumvents key problems linked to the analysis of field data. A mediator who credibly threatens punishment in the case of uncooperative behavior achieves the efficient solution in most cases. Similar results are obtained even if the mediator is biased toward one party or has no incentive to intervene. When cooperation fails, communication without credible punishment threats leads to particularly low payouts for the “losing” party
Economics · Incentive · Intervention (counseling · Mediation · Microeconomics · Political science · Process (computing · Public relations · Punishment (psychology · Computer Science · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Third-party punishment and social norms
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The Peace Brokers
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Beyond confrontation
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An Event Data Analysis of Third-Party Mediation in the Middle East and Balkans
Mediating International Crises
Mediation
Information, Bias, and Mediation Success
Overcoming Obstacles to Peace
Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting peaceful settlement
Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation
Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems
Stepping Into the Fray
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Cheap Talk
Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations
When Can Mediators Build Trust
Covenants with and without a Sword
Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias
A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |