Coupling and decoupling of unfairness and anger in ultimatum bargaining
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 12166274 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joydeep Srivastava (0000-0001-9882-5411, corresponding author), Francine Espinoza, Alexander Fedorikhin (Indiana University) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 5 |
| Pages | 475-489 |
| Publication date | 2008-12-17 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Behavioral Decision Making (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0894-3257 • E-ISSN: 1099-0771 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1002/bdm.631 |
| OpenAlex | W2019588411 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 17 |
| References cited | 35 |
Although previous research has demonstrated the importance of emotions in ultimatum bargaining, this research provides a more direct, convergent test of the role of anger in explaining rejections of unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. First, using appraisal theory of emotions, this research examines the extent to which the cognitive appraisal of unfairness leads to the emotion of anger, which in turn, drives punitive behavior (i.e., rejection of offers). Second, this research explores the possibility of decoupling the emotion of anger from its antecedent appraisal of unfairness in order to attenuate responders' inclination to reject unfair offers. Third, following the current research tradition that goes beyond a valence‐based approach, we differentiate between the negative emotions of anger and sadness and examine whether it is the specific emotion of anger that is relevant to the cognitive appraisal of unfairness or the general negative valence of the emotion. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
Anger · Appraisal theory · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Sadness · Ultimatum game · Valence (chemistry · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 17 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,13 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 17 |