Rebel attributes and the design of civil war power-sharing peace agreements
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24225185 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Sung Min Yun (0009-0009-9915-3392, Tecnológico de Monterrey) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-12 |
| Publication date | 2026-03-05 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Peace Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-3433 • E-ISSN: 1460-3578 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/jopres/xjaf006 |
| OpenAlex | W7125105838 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 82 |
Why do some peace agreements lead to electoral reforms rather than guaranteeing power to rebels through implementing power-sharing guarantees? This research question has not been thoroughly explored in the peace science literature. In this article, I argue that strategic interactions between the government and rebels with distinct attributes answer this question. Electoral participation provisions will be more likely to be implemented when stronger center-seeking rebels participate in peace negotiations. Unlike weaker center-seeking rebels, they push for extensive political power-sharing guarantees, and negotiations will be focused on the government's effort to minimize the rebels' access to significant power in the center by alternatively offering electoral participation provisions. In contrast, both stronger and weaker territorial rebels will seek territorial power-sharing or political power-sharing guarantees that enable them to govern their territories, as their primary goal is securing local/regional autonomy. Such demands are more acceptable to the government as they do not require significant concessions of power in the center. I assess my theory using global power-sharing agreements covering the period from 1975 to 2021. The findings provide empirical support for my expectations and are also robust to different measurements and model specifications. I conclude this article by discussing the implications of these findings.
peace negotiations · political power sharing · power-sharing agreements · Conflict, Peace, and Violence in Colombia · Peacebuilding and International Security · Political Conflict and Governance
The Next Generation of the Penn World Table
Committing to Peace
Peacemaking Referendums in Oceania
Intrastate Armed Conflict Termination and Foreign Direct Investment
Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict1
Face-Saving Maneuvers and Strong Third-Party Mediation
Refugees and the Study of Civil War
The Tajik civil war and peace process
Power-Sharing in Civil War
Third-party knowledge and success in civil war mediation
Democratization as an impetus for peace talks in civil wars
Intrastate peace agreements and the durability of peace
The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration
Non-state actors in civil wars
The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements
Reconstructing the correlates of war dataset on material capabilities of states, 1816–1985
Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts
Making and Keeping Promises
Maronite hegemony to Maronite militancy
Supporting rebels and hosting refugees
Committing to Peace
The Art of the Possible
Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace
From Bombs to Ballots
The Perils of Peace
Win, Lose, or Draw
Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability
Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution
Ethno-Nationalist Dyads and Civil War
Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlements
Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict
Who Punishes the Leader? Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War
Voting for Militants
Civil War and Female Empowerment
Negotiating with Rebels
How Civil Wars End
Power Sharing in Postconflict Societies
Turning the Tables
Chipping Away at the Issues
The Negotiation Calculus
When Organizations Rebel
Battles and Bargains
Selling Out or Standing Firm? Explaining the Design of Civil War Peace Agreements
Power Sharing and the Rule of Law in the Aftermath of Civil War
Fostering Peace After Civil War
Rebels at the Gates
Power and Civil War Termination Bargaining
External Engagement
Self-Enforcing Power Sharing in Weak States
Rethinking the Conflict “Resource Curse
The Role of External Actors in Incentivizing Post-Conflict Power-Sharing
Electoral Performance by Post-Rebel Parties
Identity Change and Rebel Party Political Success
Rebel-to-party transformations in civil war peace processes 1975–2011
Power Sharing
Institutionalizing Peace
Combatant Fragmentation and the Dynamics of Civil Wars
Implementing the Peace
Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War
Ethnic Politics in Djibouti
Democracy and civil war
Power-Sharing and Conflict Resolution in Africa
Power parity and peace? The role of relative power in civil war settlement
Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation
Relative Capability and Rebel Objective in Civil War
Peace agreements and women's political rights following civil war
Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes
Peace for our time? Examining the effect of power-sharing on postwar rebellions
Mineral production, territory, and ethnic rebellion
Why share? An analysis of the sources of post-conflict power-sharing
Organized violence, 1989-2018 and peace agreements
Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946-2007
Annualized implementation data on comprehensive intrastate peace accords, 1989-2012
External support in armed conflicts
Organized violence 1989-2022, and the return of conflict between states
Rebels with a cause
Safeguarding Democracy
| Highly cited | No |
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