Getting a Hand By Cutting Them Off

How Uncertainty over Political Corruption Affects Violence

Bibliographic Data

ID6228985
AuthorsPaul Zachary, William Spaniel (0000-0002-6733-385X)
Year2020
Volume50
Issue2
Pages457-480
Publication date2020-04-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueBritish Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0007123417000746
OpenAlexW2791913186
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited51

Criminal violence differs from other conflicts because illegal cartels primarily use violence to eliminate rivals rather than overthrow the state. However, politicians’ ability to influence cartel behavior remains unclear. This article argues that politicians alter the use of violence by setting their jurisdiction’s police enforcement levels, but that cartels can bribe politicians to look the other way. Because cartels are uncertain about politicians’ corruptibility, not every bribe is successful. Following an election, cartels must invest resources into learning politicians’ level of corruption. Cartels only increase their level of violence after successfully bribing political leaders, which implies that local violence levels should increase the longer parties remain in office. The study formalizes this argument and tests its implications using data on homicides and political tenure from Mexico. The results link incumbency to violence and suggest Mexico experiences an additional 948 homicides for each year of increased political tenure after holding an election

Argument (complex analysis · Cartel · Criminology · Economics · Enforcement · Jurisdiction · Language change · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Political violence · Politics · Sociology · State (computer science · Corruption and Economic Development · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance · Law · Medicine · Wildlife Conservation and Criminology Analyses

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