Manipulation and Single-Peakedness
A General Result
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230741 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Elizabeth Maggie Penn (0000-0002-2018-4367, Washington University in St. Louis), John W Patty (0000-0002-1142-9334, Washington University in St. Louis), Sean Gailmard (0000-0002-1742-5879, University of California, Berkeley) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 436-449 |
| Publication date | 2011-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00502.x |
| OpenAlex | W1517822292 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 22 |
| References cited | 51 |
This article considers environments in which individual preferences are single-peaked with respect to an unspecified, but unidimensional, ordering of the alternative space. We show that in these environments, any institution that is coalitionally strategy-proof must be dictatorial. Thus, any nondictatorial institutional environment that does not explicitly utilize an a priori ordering over alternatives in order to render a collective decision is necessarily prone to the strategic misrepresentation of preferences by an individual or a group. Moreover, we prove in this environment that for any nondictatorial institution, the truthful revelation of preferences can never be a dominant strategy equilibrium. Accordingly, an incentive to behave insincerely is inherent to the vast majority of real-world lawmaking systems, even when the policy space is unidimensional and the core is nonempty
A priori and a posteriori · Core (optical fiber · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Institution · Law and economics · Lawmaking · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Misrepresentation · Order (exchange · Political science · Space (punctuation) · Computer Science · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies
Formal Models
Perceptions of the Legitimacy of Collective Decisions
Public Reason's Chaos Theorem
Social Choice and Legitimacy
Single-peaked domains with designer uncertainty
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory
Veto players, policy change, and institutional design
Measuring Fairness, Inequality, and Big Data
Aggregation, Evaluation, and Social Choice Theory
The “Problem of Preferences”
Collective agency and positive political theory
(The Impossibility of) Deliberation‐Consistent Social Choice
A defense of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives
Public Budget Cuts
Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy
What Is Pivotal Politics (and What Else Can It Be)
Do Something” Politics and Double-Peaked Policy Preferences
Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy
May’s theorem in one dimension
The limits of information revelation in multilateral negotiations
Algorithmic Fairness and Statistical Discrimination
Are Moderates Better Representatives than Extremists? A Theory of Indirect Representation
Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House
Setting the Agenda
Information and Legislative Organization
Delegating Powers
A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions
Beyond Fairness and Deliberation
Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
Manipulation of Voting Schemes
Bureaucrats Versus Voters
Foundations of social choice theory
Social Choice and Individual Values
Pivotal Politics
Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy
Democracy Defended
The Logic of Democracy
Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees
Optimal Deliberation
On strategy-proofness and single peakedness
Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
The Structure of Voter Preferences
Aggregation and Deliberation
On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation
Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice
The Justification of Bicameralism
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules with a Heterogeneous
The Politics of Blame
Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature
Graph-Theoretical Approaches to the Theory of Voting
Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
Disaggregating Deliberation’s Effects
Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy
In Praise of Manipulation
Optimal Voting Rules
Ideological Consistency as a Collective Phenomenon
The Strategic Agenda in Legislative Politics
Sophisticated Sincerity
Farquharson and Fenno
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Democratic Theory and the Public Interest
Rousseau's General Will
Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
| Unique citing works | 22 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,57 |
| Citation span | 2012 - 2025 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 22 |