Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232010 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Adam Chilton (0000-0003-3638-6550, Chicago Kent College of Law), Adam S Chilton (University of Chicago Law School), Mila Versteeg (0000-0001-5231-9847, University of Virginia School of Law) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 575-589 |
| Publication date | 2016-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12239 |
| OpenAlex | W2474066115 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 31 |
| References cited | 69 |
Although the question of whether constitutional rights matter is of great theoretical and practical importance, little is known about whether constitutional rights impact government behavior. In this article, we test the effectiveness of six political rights. We hypothesize that a difference exists between organizational rights—most notably, the rights to unionize and form political parties—and individual rights. Specifically, we suggest that organizational rights increase de facto rights protection because they create organizations with the incentives and means to protect the underlying right, which renders these rights self‐enforcing. Such organizations are not necessarily present to protect individual rights, which could make individual rights less effective. We test our theory using a variety of statistical methods on a data set of constitutional rights for 186 countries. The results support our theory: Organizational rights are associated with increased de facto rights protection, while individual rights are not
De facto · Economics · Fundamental rights · Government (linguistics · Human rights · International human rights law · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Property rights · Reservation of rights · Right to property · Rights of Nature · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Conflict and Governance
Constitutions
Perpetuating Advantage
Consumer Protection as an Instrument for Fulfilling Human Rights in the Economic Sector and Its Constitutionalizing Efforts in the 1945 Constitution
Constitutional overperformance
The Effect of Constitutional Gender Equality Clauses
Constraining Dictatorship
Constitutions and women’s rights advocacy
Do long constitutions really hamper economic performance? A comment on Tsebelis and Nardi (2016a)
Social rights scapegoating
Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”
Islam-based legal language and state governance
Limitation Clauses and Constitutional Transformation
Empirical Studies of Human Rights Law
Keeping out of harm’s way? Constitutional due process and state repression
Enforcement of international human rights law
Compliance gaps and the failed promises of religious freedoms
Lobbying, Access Points, and the Protection of Human Rights in Democracies
The Strength of Weak Review
Public participation and constitutional compliance
Can new constitutions tighten the reins? The effect of constitutional change on constitutional compliance
Enumerating rights
Conceptualizing and Measuring Institutional Variation in National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)
Compulsory Voting Rules, Reluctant Voters and Ideological Proximity Voting
Does Police Militarization Increase Repression
The Syrian Constitution at the end of the civil war
New Evidence for a Positive Relationship between De Facto Judicial Independence and State Respect for Empowerment Rights
Rational Remedies
Being There Is Half the Battle
How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
Inferring mechanisms for global constitutional progress
Reconciling state promises and practices
Ulysses and the Sirens
The Rights Revolution
The Endurance of National Constitutions
Some distance properties of latent root and vector methods used in multivariate analysis
“When the Devil Turns … ”
Amelia II
Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?
The justice cascade
Veto Players
Politics in Time
Social Movements in Politics
Collective Action
Mostly Harmless Econometrics
The Logic of Collective Action
The Cingranelli and Richards (Ciri) Human Rights Data Project
Mobilizing for Human Rights
State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace
Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights
Workingmen's Democracy
Human Rights Enforcement From Below
Constitutionalism
Explaining Social Institutions
"Constitutional Promises" and Repressive Reality
Religions, Constitutions, and the State
Is The Law a Mere Parchment Barrier to Human Rights Abuse
Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior
Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977-1996)
Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference
Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression
Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition
Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights
Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation
Thinking Inside the Box
Rewards for Ratification
Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries1
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation
Best Evidence
The Political Economy of International Trade
International Regimes for Human Rights
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements
What to Do about Missing Values in Time‐Series Cross‐Section Data
Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression
The Informative Power of Treaty Commitment
When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence
The Changing Standard of Accountability and the Positive Relationship between Human Rights Treaty Ratification and Compliance
Comparative human rights
State Repression and Political Order
The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law
Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process
The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy
Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s
The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law
Threat and Repression
State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace
An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression
The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change
Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time
The Constraining Power of International Treaties
Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements
Human Rights in a Globalizing World
The Economics of Organization
| Unique citing works | 31 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,82 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2026 (12) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 31 |