Morals by agreement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6546200 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Gauthier (0000-0002-0964-5548, University of Pittsburgh, corresponding author), David P Gauthier |
| Year | 1987 |
| Pages | 367 |
| Publication date | 1987-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | Morals by agreement (SOURCE_BOOK) |
| Publisher | Clarendon (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/0198249926.001.0001 |
| OpenAlex | W2069551332 |
| ISBN | 9780198249924 |
| Open Library | OL18434410M |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 125 |
This book defends the traditional conception of morality as a rational, impartial constraint on the pursuit of individual interest or benefit. The principal obstacle faced by this conception is that the received account of rationality in economics and the social sciences identifies it with the maximization of individual interest (or more technically, utility); how then can a constraint on the pursuit of interest be rational? The key to meeting this obstacle is found in the recognition that in many situations, if each person seeks directly to maximize her utility, the outcome is sub‐optimal—i.e. at least one alternative would benefit everyone. This suggests that we think of morality in a contractarian way, i.e. as the object of a universal rational bargain in which all agree to constrain their pursuit of interest by acting on a principle that would yield optimality, i.e. an outcome such that no alternative would benefit everyone. Such a principle is developed on the basis of the idea that rational persons seek to minimize their bargaining concessions, and establish its moral status by showing that it is an impartial constraint on everyone's behaviour. There are however two problems: (1) why would rational persons honour their agreement to act on this principle, if they could do better to violate it? and (2) what would rational persons accept as an initial position, from which they would bargain? To answer the first question, it is shown that, under plausible conditions, persons may expect to benefit from a disposition (constrained maximization) to act with others on a rationally agreed principle, rather than from a disposition (straightforward maximization) to maximize directly their individual utility. To answer the second, it is shown that the basis from which agreement proceeds must rationally be constrained by what is called the (Lockean) proviso, which prohibits bettering one's situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another. We sketch brief applications of our account of morality to questions about taxation, appropriation, relations between societies, and relations among generations. Finally, we seek to distinguish the view of human beings and fulfilment underlying our theory from the caricature of ‘economic man’, developing a conception of the liberal individual.
appropriations · constrained maximization · contractarianism · Economics · Epistemology · Ethics · Foundation (evidence) · Homo economicus · impartial spectator · intergenerational justice · Law and economics · Lockean proviso · Mathematical economics · Morality · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Social contract · Taxation · Utility maximization · Value (mathematics) · Law · Legal Education and Practice Innovations · Legal principles and applications · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Society, Economy, and Ethics Research · Contractarianism (Ethics) · Contracts · Cooperation · Ethik · Sozialvertrag
Are Liberty and Equality Compatible?
The Politics of the Environment
Practical Reasoning in a Social World
Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life
Globality and Connectivity
The Absurd Conclusion
The Repugnant Conclusion
Why We Should Reject S
The Mere Addition Paradox
What We Believe Ourselves to Be
Personal Identity and Morality
The Non‐Identity Problem
Different Attitudes to Time
How We Are not What We Believe
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
A World Without Deception
Five Mistakes in Moral Mathematics
What Does Matter
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Theories That Are Indirectly Self‐Defeating
Personal Identity and Rationality
Concluding Chapter
Practical Dilemmas
Conclusions
Why Our Identity Is not What Matters
The Appeal to Full Relativity
The Autonomy of Morality
Free to Trust
Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments.
Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments"
Thinking as a Team
Reasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking.
Individual differences in reasoning
The Social License to Operate
Toward a political conception of corporate responsibility
A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences
Historical Emissions and Free-Riding
Contractarian theory, deliberative democracy and general agreement
Rescuing Socialism from Equality
The Self as Narrator
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism
Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice
Autonomy and Self-Identity
Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism
Autonomy, Self-Knowledge, and Liberal Legitimacy
The common good
Political Liberty
Foucault and creative resistance in organisations
Justice and Democracy
Justice, democracy and public goods
Liberty, Desert and the Market
Autonomy and Male Dominance
Constitutional Contractarianism
On Finding Solutions to Ethical Problems in Agriculture
Negotiating as an ethics action (praxis) strategy
Kantian constructivism and the authority of others
Filosofia (analítica) do Desporto
Collective Agency and Coalitional Power in Games
Cultivating Dignity in Intelligent Systems
Die Rolle der Gerechtigkeit in der Regulierung von Märkten
The Semantic Equivalence Between the Good and the Right
Against the extremes
Moral status of the fetus and the permissibility of abortion
The Tyranny of Political Correctness? A Game‐Theoretic Model of Social Norms and Implicit Bias
Misinformation, subjectivism, and the rational criticizability of desire
Testimonial contractarianism
Game theory and omniscience
Cooperation – Kantian-style
What is the point of behavioural public policy? A contractarian approach
The Political Economy of Media Capabilities
Trust in Political Leaders as Trustworthiness
Contractarianism
Arguments de choix rationnel et contractualisme
Peter Vanderschraaf, Strategic Justice
The Political Economy of Constitution
Le programme rawlsien apocryphe
Modular Ontologies for Genetically Modified People and their Bioethical Implications
The distributive liberal social contract as definite norm of communicative action
De l’univocité du principe de différence de Rawls
The relativity of fact-sensitivity
Egalitarianism and the Great Recession
Social Membership, Contribution, and Justice
Notes From The Exclusion Zone
The Practice-Independence of Intergenerational Justice
A world without violet
O Normativismo Uniforme De Tugendhat E O Elogio a Aristóteles
Relational Conceptions of Justice
The Ethics of Economic Interactions in the Network Economy
Sustainable Development for Uganda
The Moderate Communitarian Individual and the Primacy of Duties
Macrojustice
A fairer and more effective carbon tax
Do markets foster selfishness
Climate change and transformations of justice—Views of just distribution in the Finnish policy debate
Naturalizing Moral Naturalism
How to Solve Prichard's Dilemma
The Normative Significance of Conscience
Kantian Free Riding
Transforming Bourdieu's "perfect" economy of symbolic goods into an imperfect one – The moral grounding of water transfers in Khartoum
Reasons and Persons
| Citations per year | 3.13 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1986 - 2026 (41) |
| Highly cited | Yes |