Reciprocal Strategies for Large Groups
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7516201 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Craig D Parks (0000-0001-5299-093X, Washington State University, corresponding author), Komorita, Samuel S Komorita (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 1 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 314-322 |
| Publication date | 1997-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Personality and Social Psychology Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1532-7957 • E-ISSN: 1088-8683 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1207/s15327957pspr0104_3 |
| PMID | 15661666 |
| OpenAlex | W2035212911 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 28 |
Reciprocal strategies have been shown to be effective in inducing long-term cooperation in social dilemmas involving small, but not large, groups. In this article, we argue that group-based reciprocal strategies (GBRS)--under which one reciprocates cooperative factions, not individuals, within the group--can induce cooperation in large groups. Results of two computer simulations of 100-member groups show that a GBRS accumulates a significantly larger payoff than do other commonly advocated mixed-motive strategies. A third simulation showed that the size of the cooperative faction is influenced by the nature of the payoff matrix; when there is considerable temptation to defect, one should cooperate only after a large number of others have done so, but if there is little temptation to defect, one should reciprocate the cooperative actions of a smaller faction. We also found that the use of a "win-cooperate, lose-defect" heuristic led to substantial total outcomes. Our results suggest several psychological factors are important in facilitating cooperation, yet need empirical study
Reciprocal · Complex Network Analysis Techniques · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Psychology · Social Psychology
Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming
The Social Psychology of Groups
Interpersonal Relations
The optimality of tit‐for‐tat
The Possibility of Cooperation
Reciprocity and the induction of cooperation in social dilemmas
When in Doubt
A model of the N-person dilemma-type game
The Effects of Reward Structure and Reciprocity in Social Dilemmas
Computer simulation
The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment
Reciprocity and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Automata Simulation of N-Person Social Dilemma Games
Inhibiting effects of reciprocation wariness on interpersonal relationships
Motivation losses in small groups
Identifiability as a deterrant to social loafing
The consideration of future consequences
The Norm of Reciprocity
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,22 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2013 (15) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |