Motivational Job Assignments
Motivational Job Assignments
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9726212 |
|---|---|
| Authors | JULIA NAFZIGER (0000-0003-3307-3073, Aarhus University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue | 312 |
| Pages | 676-696 |
| Publication date | 2011-10-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2010.00865.x |
| OpenAlex | W1542624951 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 39 |
This paper asks how a firm combines bonus payments with job assignments (through which it affects an employee's self-efficacy) to provide incentives. We show that the firm chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the employee's self-efficacy. The higher the employee's self-efficacy, the higher his work motivation and thus the lower the bonus the firm has to pay. Thus distortions in the job assignment lead to losses in production, but savings in the wage bill. This finding provides an explanation for why firms do not separate job assignments from the provision of incentives
Economics · Employment and Welfare Studies · Job Satisfaction and Organizational Behavior · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Psychology
Internal labor markets and manpower analysis
Two Cultures of Policing
The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats
Self-Esteem Within the Work and Organizational Context
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
Self-Efficacy
The Power of Being Positive
Psychological foundations of incentives
Development of the Job Diagnostic Survey.
Cops, Teachers, Counselors
Self-efficacy
Job Characteristics and Internal Motivation
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation
Self-efficacy and work-related performance
Paying Respect
How Common is Workplace Transformation and Who Adopts it
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1991 - 1991 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |