Svenn Lindskold
Biographic Data
| ID | 1493545 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Svenn Lindskold |
| GIVEN NAMES | Svenn |
| FAMILY NAME | Lindskold |
| SIGNATURE | LINDSKOLD S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ohio University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 21 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 147 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1969 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Transforming Competitive or Cooperative Climates
In two studies 200 subjects played repeated trials of Prisoner's Dilemma with a simulated other who could send verbal communications. In the first study, the other began intensifying conflict by being behaviorally unresponsive over a long duration, by being totally noncooperative, by responding more quickly to the competition than the cooperation of the subject, or by coercing cooperation with threats for the purpose of exploitation. Then the oth…
Repeated persuasion in interpersonal conflict
Cooperators, Competitors, and Response to GRIT
Eighty-seven subjects were classified as cooperators and competitors. They then participated in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation with a simulated other who, after 10 trials of 50% cooperation, followed one of three strategies during the next 10 trials: GRIT, tit-for-tat, or 100% cooperation. As predicted, competitors as well as cooperators responded cooperatively only to the GRIT strategy. During the final 10 trials, which were 100% cooper…
Deindividuation, Self-Awareness, and Impression Management
Styles of Announcing Conciliation
A total of 48 subjects (24 female and 24 male) participated in 30 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a simulated other who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third block. Following trial 10, the other sent one of two handwritten notes to the subject, or, in a third condition, sent none. One of the notes said, in effect: "If you cooperate, I will," (the IF-U note) while the other said: "I will coo…
Conciliatory strategies and relative power
Conciliation with Simultaneous or Sequential Interaction: Variations in Trustworthiness and Vulnerability in the Prisoner's Dilemma
A total of 96 subjects, half women and half men, opposed a simulated player who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third (last) block. In the second block the latter either was 50% cooperative (control condition) or, in the GRIT condition, communicated and carried out a conciliatory strategy that included some retaliation. The subjects made their choices on each trial either before, after, or simultane…
Inducing Cooperation by Groups and Individuals: Applying Osgood's Grit Strategy
Thirty-two groups and an equal number of individuals opposed one of four programmed strategies, presumably carried out by an individual, in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programmed strategies included (a) a GRIT strategy involving a general statement of intent, specific announcements of choices, and some retaliation to exploitation; (b) a competitive strategy in which announcements were used deceitfully; (c) a tit-for-tat strategy …
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
Cooperation and the Use of Coercion by Groups and Individuals
In two experiments, male and female subjects, either as individuals or as groups, participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma and could communicate either threats of punishment for target noncooperation or promises of their own cooperation. In Experiment 1 they opposed a live target; in Experiment 2 they opposed a simulated target who was either cooperative or competitive in response to the subjects' messages. The major finding was that groups more stro…
Territorial Boundaries of Interacting Groups and Passive Audiences
Rate of participation and expertise as factors influencing leader choice
Seventy-two female subjects were placed in four-person problem-solving groups. A confederate in each group was identified as either expert or inexpert, made expert or inexpert contributions, and either talked a lot or relatively little. The problem was made high or low in ambiguity. It was hypothesized that, as previous studies have shown, a high rate of participation would influence choice of the confederate as leader in the inexpert condition b…
Effects of Target's Disclosure of Intent on Exercise of Influence in Conflict
40 preadolescents played a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game in which they were given opportunities to communicate either promises of their own cooperation or threats of a fine if the target did not cooperate. A simulated target replied either honestly or evasively while being two-thirds cooperative on the message-relevant trials. The results supported an extension of the Osgood proposal and clarified previous research. As hypothesized, Ss in the …
The Effects of Group Size and Discussion Time on the Risky Shift
In two experiments the effects of group size and discussion time on the risky shift in Western culture were studied. In Experiment I it was found that only four-person groups given three minutes to discuss each item shifted: while eight-person groups and groups with nine minutes did not shift. Discussion time for four-person groups was varied over four levels in Experiment II. It was found that three-minute, five-minute, and unlimited discussion …
Correlations Between Trust, Self-Esteem, Sociometric Choice, and Internal-External Control
Attributing trust and conciliatory intent from coercive power capability
A note regarding an expected value model of social power
Developmental aspects of reaction to positive inducements
The effects of opportunity costs and target compliance on the behavior of a threatening source
Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance
Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and anti…
Social power and the credibility of promises
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
Transforming Competitive or Cooperative Climates
In two studies 200 subjects played repeated trials of Prisoner's Dilemma with a simulated other who could send verbal communications. In the first study, the other began intensifying conflict by being behaviorally unresponsive over a long duration, by being totally noncooperative, by responding more quickly to the competition than the cooperation of the subject, or by coercing cooperation with threats for the purpose of exploitation. Then the oth…
Inducing Cooperation by Groups and Individuals: Applying Osgood's Grit Strategy
Thirty-two groups and an equal number of individuals opposed one of four programmed strategies, presumably carried out by an individual, in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programmed strategies included (a) a GRIT strategy involving a general statement of intent, specific announcements of choices, and some retaliation to exploitation; (b) a competitive strategy in which announcements were used deceitfully; (c) a tit-for-tat strategy …
Cooperators, Competitors, and Response to GRIT
Eighty-seven subjects were classified as cooperators and competitors. They then participated in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation with a simulated other who, after 10 trials of 50% cooperation, followed one of three strategies during the next 10 trials: GRIT, tit-for-tat, or 100% cooperation. As predicted, competitors as well as cooperators responded cooperatively only to the GRIT strategy. During the final 10 trials, which were 100% cooper…
Conciliation with Simultaneous or Sequential Interaction: Variations in Trustworthiness and Vulnerability in the Prisoner's Dilemma
A total of 96 subjects, half women and half men, opposed a simulated player who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third (last) block. In the second block the latter either was 50% cooperative (control condition) or, in the GRIT condition, communicated and carried out a conciliatory strategy that included some retaliation. The subjects made their choices on each trial either before, after, or simultane…
Cooperation and the Use of Coercion by Groups and Individuals
In two experiments, male and female subjects, either as individuals or as groups, participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma and could communicate either threats of punishment for target noncooperation or promises of their own cooperation. In Experiment 1 they opposed a live target; in Experiment 2 they opposed a simulated target who was either cooperative or competitive in response to the subjects' messages. The major finding was that groups more stro…
Attributing trust and conciliatory intent from coercive power capability
Styles of Announcing Conciliation
A total of 48 subjects (24 female and 24 male) participated in 30 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a simulated other who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third block. Following trial 10, the other sent one of two handwritten notes to the subject, or, in a third condition, sent none. One of the notes said, in effect: "If you cooperate, I will," (the IF-U note) while the other said: "I will coo…
Social power and the credibility of promises
Conciliatory strategies and relative power
Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance
Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and anti…
Rate of participation and expertise as factors influencing leader choice
Seventy-two female subjects were placed in four-person problem-solving groups. A confederate in each group was identified as either expert or inexpert, made expert or inexpert contributions, and either talked a lot or relatively little. The problem was made high or low in ambiguity. It was hypothesized that, as previous studies have shown, a high rate of participation would influence choice of the confederate as leader in the inexpert condition b…
The effects of opportunity costs and target compliance on the behavior of a threatening source
Repeated persuasion in interpersonal conflict
Territorial Boundaries of Interacting Groups and Passive Audiences
Developmental aspects of reaction to positive inducements
Social power and the credibility of promises
Developmental aspects of reaction to positive inducements
The effects of opportunity costs and target compliance on the behavior of a threatening source
Power, Influence, and Behavioral Compliance
Social psychologists have traditionally been concerned with problems of social conflict, power, influence, and persuasion. Yet, when one looks for systematic theory and evidence regarding the determinants of behavioral compliance to rules, norms, or influence attempts, few prescriptions can be garnered by the practical man of affairs for developing policy in matters of law and order. In a day when shouts of black power, student protests, and anti…
A note regarding an expected value model of social power
The Effects of Group Size and Discussion Time on the Risky Shift
In two experiments the effects of group size and discussion time on the risky shift in Western culture were studied. In Experiment I it was found that only four-person groups given three minutes to discuss each item shifted: while eight-person groups and groups with nine minutes did not shift. Discussion time for four-person groups was varied over four levels in Experiment II. It was found that three-minute, five-minute, and unlimited discussion …
Correlations Between Trust, Self-Esteem, Sociometric Choice, and Internal-External Control
Attributing trust and conciliatory intent from coercive power capability
Effects of Target's Disclosure of Intent on Exercise of Influence in Conflict
40 preadolescents played a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game in which they were given opportunities to communicate either promises of their own cooperation or threats of a fine if the target did not cooperate. A simulated target replied either honestly or evasively while being two-thirds cooperative on the message-relevant trials. The results supported an extension of the Osgood proposal and clarified previous research. As hypothesized, Ss in the …
Rate of participation and expertise as factors influencing leader choice
Seventy-two female subjects were placed in four-person problem-solving groups. A confederate in each group was identified as either expert or inexpert, made expert or inexpert contributions, and either talked a lot or relatively little. The problem was made high or low in ambiguity. It was hypothesized that, as previous studies have shown, a high rate of participation would influence choice of the confederate as leader in the inexpert condition b…
Territorial Boundaries of Interacting Groups and Passive Audiences
Cooperation and the Use of Coercion by Groups and Individuals
In two experiments, male and female subjects, either as individuals or as groups, participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma and could communicate either threats of punishment for target noncooperation or promises of their own cooperation. In Experiment 1 they opposed a live target; in Experiment 2 they opposed a simulated target who was either cooperative or competitive in response to the subjects' messages. The major finding was that groups more stro…
Inducing Cooperation by Groups and Individuals: Applying Osgood's Grit Strategy
Thirty-two groups and an equal number of individuals opposed one of four programmed strategies, presumably carried out by an individual, in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programmed strategies included (a) a GRIT strategy involving a general statement of intent, specific announcements of choices, and some retaliation to exploitation; (b) a competitive strategy in which announcements were used deceitfully; (c) a tit-for-tat strategy …
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
Conciliation with Simultaneous or Sequential Interaction: Variations in Trustworthiness and Vulnerability in the Prisoner's Dilemma
A total of 96 subjects, half women and half men, opposed a simulated player who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third (last) block. In the second block the latter either was 50% cooperative (control condition) or, in the GRIT condition, communicated and carried out a conciliatory strategy that included some retaliation. The subjects made their choices on each trial either before, after, or simultane…
Conciliatory strategies and relative power
Deindividuation, Self-Awareness, and Impression Management
Styles of Announcing Conciliation
A total of 48 subjects (24 female and 24 male) participated in 30 trials of a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a simulated other who was 50% cooperative in the first block of 10 trials and 100% cooperative in the third block. Following trial 10, the other sent one of two handwritten notes to the subject, or, in a third condition, sent none. One of the notes said, in effect: "If you cooperate, I will," (the IF-U note) while the other said: "I will coo…
Cooperators, Competitors, and Response to GRIT
Eighty-seven subjects were classified as cooperators and competitors. They then participated in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation with a simulated other who, after 10 trials of 50% cooperation, followed one of three strategies during the next 10 trials: GRIT, tit-for-tat, or 100% cooperation. As predicted, competitors as well as cooperators responded cooperatively only to the GRIT strategy. During the final 10 trials, which were 100% cooper…
Transforming Competitive or Cooperative Climates
In two studies 200 subjects played repeated trials of Prisoner's Dilemma with a simulated other who could send verbal communications. In the first study, the other began intensifying conflict by being behaviorally unresponsive over a long duration, by being totally noncooperative, by responding more quickly to the competition than the cooperation of the subject, or by coercing cooperation with threats for the purpose of exploitation. Then the oth…
Repeated persuasion in interpersonal conflict
Psychology (19 works) · Social Psychology (17 works) · Social Psychology (14 works) · Social and Intergroup Psychology (11 works) · Political science (8 works) · Dilemma (7 works) · Mathematics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Grit (5 works)