Inducing Cooperation by Groups and Individuals
Applying Osgood's Grit Strategy
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6285540 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Svenn Lindskold (Ohio University), Michael G Collins (0000-0002-6692-1764, Ohio University) |
| Year | 1978 |
| Volume | 22 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 679-690 |
| Publication date | 1978-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Conflict Resolution (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-0027 • E-ISSN: 1552-8766 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publications Inc (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1177/002200277802200406 |
| OpenAlex | W2107526583 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 8 |
Thirty-two groups and an equal number of individuals opposed one of four programmed strategies, presumably carried out by an individual, in a 30-trial Prisoner's Dilemma situation. The programmed strategies included (a) a GRIT strategy involving a general statement of intent, specific announcements of choices, and some retaliation to exploitation; (b) a competitive strategy in which announcements were used deceitfully; (c) a tit-for-tat strategy without any verbal communication; and (d) a 50% cooperative control strategy. For both groups and individuals the GRIT strategy promoted more cooperation than any of the other three. This difference vanished toward the end of the third block of ten trials in which all four strategies involved consistent, unannounced cooperation. Females were more cooperative than males. It was concluded that GRIT is as effective with groups as with individuals, even though prior research indicates groups to be less conciliatory in their preference for influence modes and at times less cooperative than individuals
Control (management · Dilemma · Economics · Game theory · Grit · Management · Microeconomics · Preference · Strategy · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology
Is Punishment Effective? Coercive Strategies in Social Exchange
The legitimization of political violence
Presidential address
Grit and gradualism — 25 years on
Why promises and threats need each other
Disarmament, Arms Control, and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Beyond Deterrence
Conciliatory strategies and relative power
Response to Strategy and Communication in an Arms Race-Disarmament Dilemma
Cooperators, Competitors, and Response to GRIT
Styles of Announcing Conciliation
Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary
Conciliation with Simultaneous or Sequential Interaction
Perceptual Illusions and Military Realities
The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation
An alternative to war or surrender.
Interpersonal Attraction and the Exercise of Coercive and Reward Power
Reciprocation and other techniques for inducing cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Effects of programmed strategies on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and other mixed-motive games
Cooperation and the Use of Coercion by Groups and Individuals
The group polarization phenomenon
Trust development, the GRIT proposal, and the effects of conciliatory acts on conflict and cooperation
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 1979 - 2014 (36) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |