Uncertainty, Shifting Power, and Appeasement
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3591945 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert Powell (0000-0003-2768-0555, University of California, Berkeley, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 749-764 |
| Publication date | 1996-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Political Science Review (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2945840 |
| OpenAlex | W2330856954 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 49 |
| References cited | 29 |
Great Britain faced an immensely complicated strategic problem in the 1930s, and important aspects of it can be stylized as a situation in which a state that is declining in power is unsure of the aims of a rising state. If those aims are limited, then the declining state prefers to appease the rising state's demands rather than go to war to oppose them. If, however, the rising state's demands are unlimited, then the declining state prefers fighting. And, given that the declining state is becoming weaker over time, it prefers fighting sooner rather than later if there is to be a war. This situation creates a trade-off: The earlier a state stands firm, the stronger it will be if war ensues, but the higher the chance of fighting an unnecessary war. In equilibrium, the declining state generally tries to appease the rising state by making a series of concessions
Appeasement · Development economics · Economics · Economy · Great power · Keynesian economics · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · State (computer science · Stylized fact · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Politics and Conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Middle East
Central Issues In The Study Of International Conflict
Monsters to Destroy
Regions of War and Peace
Do Small Powers Retrench
The role and place of ‘military territoriality’ in the Clausewitzian conception of war
Why Forecasts Fail
Power shifts, third-party threats, and credible signals
The grand strategy of hegemonic decline
The Policy Implications of Power Parity
Trust, cooperation, and the tradeoffs of reciprocity
Measuring National Power
Mutual uncertainty and credible reassurance
Investigating the Preventive Motive for War
Useful ignorance
Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict
Resource concentration and civil wars
The international political economy of appeasement
Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions
A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation
Bad World
Strategic Mass Killings
Revisiting Our Understanding of Major Power Diplomacy
Risk Aversion in International Relations Theory
An Economic Theory of War
Fear, Appeasement, and the Effectiveness of Deterrence
Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited
Fighting Battles, Winning Wars
Hedging for Better Bets
Sequencing the Peace
Target Concessions in the Shadow of Intervention
International Relations and the Psychology of Time Horizons1
Fully Informed and on the Road to Ruin
The Dark Side of the Future
Rational Appeasement
Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration
Domestic Explanations of International Relations
Retrenchment as a Screening Mechanism
Offsetting Uncertainty
Terrorism, Dynamic Commitment Problems, and Military Conflict
The Political Costs of Crisis Bargaining
Implementing the Peace
Dyadic Hostility and the Ties That Bind
Military power and political objectives in armed interventions
Third-party trade, political similarity, and dyadic conflict
The Study of Appeasement in International Relations
Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace
Both Guns and Butter, or Neither
Military Coercion in Interstate Crises
An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace
The origins of the Second World War
Paths to War
Parity and War
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Perception and Misperception in International Politics
War and Change in World Politics
Retreat from Power
Strategy and Diplomacy 1870-1945
The War Ledger
Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence
Munich, 1938
Courtship as a Waiting Game
Stability and the Distribution of Power
Rationalist explanations for war
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
When Do Power Shifts Lead to War
Nuclear Deterrence and the Strategy of Limited Retaliation
Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD
Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
| Unique citing works | 49 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,75 |
| Citation span | 1998 - 2026 (29) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 49 |