The priority of intentional action

From developmental to conceptual priority

Bibliographic Data

ID4351941
AuthorsYagil Levy (0000-0003-2167-1260, Tel Aviv University, corresponding author)
Year2025
Volume75
Issue2
Pages598-631
Publication date2025-03-24
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/pq/pqae023
OpenAlexW4396833733
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited92

Philosophical orthodoxy has it that intentional action consists in one's intention appropriately causing a motion of one's body, placing the latter (conceptually and/or metaphysically) prior to the former. Here, I argue that this standard schema should be reversed: acting intentionally is at least conceptually prior to intending. The argument is modelled on a Williamsonian argument for the priority of knowledge developed by Jenifer Nagel. She argues that children acquire the concept KNOWS before they acquire BELIEVES, building on this alleged developmental priority of knowledge to establish its conceptual priority. I start by taking a closer look at Nagel's argument, canvassing extant objections todo both with the empirical adequacy of her claims and their philosophical implications. Doing so allows me, in the second part of the paper, to draw lessons that inform the construction of a revamped parallel argument for the priority of ACTS INTENTIONALLY

Action (physics) · Cognitive science · Priority inheritance · Autism Spectrum Disorder Research · Behavioral and Psychological Studies · Child and Animal Learning Development · Computer Science · Psychology

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