Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority
An Experimental Investigation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6230164 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eric S Dickson (0000-0001-6389-7589, New York University), Sanford C Gordon (0000-0001-6373-2792, New York University), Gregory A Huber (0000-0001-6804-8148, Yale University) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 109-127 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0092-5853 • E-ISSN: 1540-5907 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ajps.12139 |
| OpenAlex | W1530170343 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 24 |
| References cited | 46 |
Unelected officials with coercive powers (e.g., police, prosecutors, bureaucrats) vary markedly in the extent to which citizens view their actions as legitimate. We explore the institutional determinants of legitimate authority in the context of a public goods laboratory experiment. In the experiment, an “authority” can target one “citizen” for punishment following citizen contribution choices. Untargeted citizens can then choose to help or hinder the authority. This latter choice may be interpreted as a behavioral measure of the authority's legitimacy. We find that legitimacy is affected by how authorities are compensated, the transparency with which their decisions are observed, and an interaction between these. When transparency is high, citizens are more willing to assist authorities who receive fixed salaries than those who personally benefit from collected penalties, even when citizens' material incentives are controlled for. Lower transparency reduces support, but only for salaried enforcers
Business · Context (archaeology · Economics · Express trust · Incentive · Law and economics · Legitimacy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public good · Public relations · Public trust · Punishment (psychology · Transparency (behavior · Corruption and Economic Development · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Psychology · Public Administration · Social Psychology
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Cooperating with the State
Unfair Rules for Unequal Pay
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Conditional legitimacy
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Cooperation through collective punishment and participation
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| Unique citing works | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,4 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2025 (10) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |