Influence without Confidence
Upper Chambers and Government Formation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6300740 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James N Druckman (0000-0002-1249-6790, Northwestern University), Leonard W Martins (0000-0003-4051-3495, Rice University), Lanny W Martins, Michael F Thies, Michael Thies (0000-0002-8965-7476, University of California, Los Angeles) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 30 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 529-548 |
| Publication date | 2005-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Legislative Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0362-9805 • E-ISSN: 1939-9162 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.3162/036298005x201662 |
| OpenAlex | W3125840534 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 40 |
| References cited | 43 |
In most parliamentary democracies, governments must maintain the confidence of a single legislative chamber only. But in bicameral parliaments, upper chambers can affect the fortunes of government policy proposals. Recent work shows that parliamentary governments that lack control over the upper house also tend to collapse sooner than those with upper-house majorities. In this article, we show that coalition builders anticipate the importance of upper-chamber status (majority or minority) in making their formation decisions. After controlling for a host of "usual suspect" variables concerning the institutional, ideological, and partisan context of coalition building, and examining 15,590 potential governments in 129 bargaining situations, we found that potential coalitions that control upper-house majorities are significantly more likely to form than are those with upper-house minorities. Our findings are important for students of bicameralism, government formation, institutions, and, perhaps most significantly, for those who study policymaking in parliamentary democracies
Chamber of Deputies · Context (archaeology · Control (management · Democracy · Economics · Government (linguistics · Ideology · Legislature · Lower house · Management · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Suspect · Work (physics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Public Administration · Public Policy and Administration Research · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Tying the hands of coalition partners in international negotiations
Stronger Veto, Less Fragmented Party Systems
Examining the Micro-level Foundations of Japan’s Two-party System Following Government Alternation
Pawns Take Queen
Loss of control
Coalition Politics and Inter‐Party Conflict Management
Government formation and breakdown in Western and Central Eastern Europe
Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities
The reinvention of consensus politics
Does Bicameralism Promote Stability? Inter-institutional Relations and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament
Oversized coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe
Party System Institutionalization and Government Formation in new Democracies
Institutionalizing a Coalitional System and Games within Coalitions in India (1996–2014)
Oversized Government Coalitions in Latin America
Government Selection and Executive Powers
The formalisation of minority governments
Institutions and coalition formation
Dividing Parliament? Italian Bicameralism in the Legislative Process (1987–2006)
Contexts and Constraints
Government Agenda-Setting and Bicameral Conflict Resolution
New Empirical Strategies for the Study of Parliamentary Government Formation
The political geography of government formation
Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Formation
Bicameralism, intra-party bargaining, and the formation of party policy positions
Bicameralism Hinges on Legislative Professionalism
Back to the Westminster model? The Brexit process and the UK political system
Bicameralism and government formation
Institutional veto players and cabinet formation
Do party supporters accept policy compromises in coalition governments
Portfolio allocation patterns and policy‐making effectiveness in minority coalition governments
Institutional constraints on cabinet formation
Bicameralism and the Logic of Party Organization
Party System Congruence and Bicameralism
Divided Politics
A Scaling Model for Estimating Time‐Series Party Positions from Texts
Bicameralism and Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion
A Coalescência Revisitada
Political dynasties and direct elections in bicameralism
The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation
The Formation of Cabinet Coalitions in Presidential Systems
Coalitions in Parliamentary Government
The theory of political coalitions.
Making and Breaking Governments
Bicameralism
The measurement of urban travel demand
Specification Tests for the Multinomial Logit Model
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
Veto Players
Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
Bicameralism and Budget Deficits
Executive-Legislative Relations in an Era of Accelerated Reform
The Impact of Bicameralism on Legislative Production
Cicero's Puzzle
The Justification of Bicameralism
The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial Democracies
Party organisation and party competitiveness
Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems
Formation rules and minority governments
An “Events” Approach to the Problem of Cabinet Stability
Expectations and Informal Rules in Coalition Formation
Minimizing the Risks of Delegation
The Importance of Concurrence
Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies
Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions
Keeping Tabs on Partners
Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival
Policing the Bargain
Modelling Cabinet Durability and Termination
Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections
Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution
The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies
How Does Cabinet Instability Affect Political Performance? Portfolio Volatility and Health Care Cost Containment in Parliamentary Democracies
The Core of the Constitution
The Costs of Coalition
| Unique citing works | 40 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,9 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 40 |