Mutual Optimism as a Cause of Conflict
Secret Alliances and Conflict Onset
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6272602 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Muhammet A Bas (Harvard University Press), Muhammet Bas (0000-0001-9309-8702), Robert Schub (0000-0003-3315-4957, Harvard University Press) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 552-564 |
| Publication date | 2016-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International Studies Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-8833 • E-ISSN: 1468-2478 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/isq/sqw002 |
| OpenAlex | W2325770740 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 19 |
| References cited | 57 |
A prominent international-relations theory posits that mutual optimism, due to two sides holding divergent estimates of their relative bargaining power, causes interstate conflict. We develop a theory of mutual optimism in which conflicting bargaining power estimates arise from asymmetric information about which, if any, third parties will join either side in a military dispute. We contend that secret alliances can generate mutual optimism, which increases the probability of conflict. By exploiting secret alliances as a measurable source of private information, we provide the first systematic test of mutual optimism that directly assesses a state's secret capabilities. Optimism exists when a state's secret allies are more numerous or powerful than anticipated by opponents. Our empirical tests—as well as robustness checks—strongly support our theoretical expectation. We conclude that mutual optimism is an empirically, as well as theoretically, important cause of interstate conflict
Computer security · Economics · Law and economics · Optimism · Political science · Positive economics · Private information retrieval · Robustness (evolution · State (computer science · Computer Science · Defense, Military, and Policy Studies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Political Conflict and Governance · Psychology · Social Psychology
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Letting sleeping bears lie
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The logic of secret alliances
The Effective Power of Military Coalitions
Mutual Optimism and Costly Conflict
Fanatical Peace
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Secrecy among Friends
Military Coalitions and the Politics of Information
Public Reactions to Secret Negotiations in International Politics
Regime Uncertainty and Interstate Conflict
Peaceful Uncertainty
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What the Enemy Knows
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Terminating Alliances
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From Bosnia to Sarajevo
Reevaluating Alliance Reliability
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How Uncertainty about War Outcomes Affects War Onset
Bargaining and the Nature of War
Uncertainty, Salient Stakes, and the Causes of Conventional Arms Races
Causes of Peace
Alliance Formation and War
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Alliance Reliability in Times of War
To Concede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect of Military Alliances
Reputation, Symmetry, and Alliance Design
Rationalist explanations for war
The Might of the Pen
Autocratic Audience Costs
Feigning Weakness
Alliances
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Why Democracies May Actually Be Less Reliable Allies
Deterring Intervention
Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve
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Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation of War
Interests, Institutions, and the Reliability of International Commitments
Mutual Optimism and War
Tying Hands Behind Closed Doors
Measuring Alliances
Me, myself, and allies
The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations
Peace, War, and the Balance of Power
Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
Information, Power, and War
| Unique citing works | 19 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,11 |
| Citation span | 2017 - 2026 (10) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 19 |